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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Local Political Contexts and Immigrant Integration
by
Dalston G. Ward
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017
Professor Margit Tavits, Chair
Understanding the causes of immigrant integration is critical, as its failure can pose
substantial economic and social costs for natives and immigrants alike. In this dissertation,
I explore the role of local politics and immigrant demographics in explaining variation in
immigrant integration across localities. In the first chapter, I develop a theory linking
local politics to immigrant integration. Specifically, I argue that when local governing
parties have anti-immigrant ideologies, integration becomes more difficult. I test this
argument using data from refugees entering Denmark between 1986 and 1998. These
refugees were spatially dispersed across Denmark’s 275 municipalities, allowing me to
identify the effect of local government. The second chapter investigates the role of intra-
immigrant diversity in promoting integration. I argue that natives are less likely to
negatively stereotype diverse groups of immigrants, reducing anti-immigrant attitudes
and discrimination. Experimental and observational evidence support this argument.
Experimentally, I conducted a conjoint survey on a sample of 2,130 Germans to show
the link between diversity and anti-immigrant attitudes. Observationally, I use data on
immigrant diversity and immigrant unemployment to show diversity’s beneficial effect on
integration. The final chapter examines natives’ attitudes toward young immigrant men.
Leveraging the same conjoint survey as above, I show that immigrant groups with many
young men provoke substantial opposition. Further tests reveal that this opposition is
due to the security and cultural threats provoked by young men. These findings have
implications for our understanding of integration, of attitudes toward immigrants, and of
the consequences of immigrant settlement patterns.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Substantial growth in the size of immigrant populations over recent decades has made the
integration of these new arrivals a priority in many developed democracies. According to
one classical definition, integration is the removal of barriers to equal and full participation
in society (Kymlicka 1995). Successful integration, therefore, means that immigrants
are able to participate equal to natives in social life, the economy, and the political
system. These outcomes can enrich the society of the host country (Akay et al. 2017;
Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2015, 2017; Maxwell 2017) and improve the
quality of life for immigrants and natives alike. Unsuccessful integration, on the other
hand, can have a number of deleterious consequences: economic marginalization (Adida,
Laitin and Valfort 2016; Dancygier and Laitin 2014), violence (Dancygier 2010), and
political exclusion (Hochschild et al. 2013).
For these reasons, understanding the causes of successful and failed integration has
been a central task for immigration scholars. National-level policy regimes, such as multi-
culturalism and assimilation (Koopmans 2013) or the strictness of citizenship laws (Good-
man 2010; Howard 2009), have been identified as important factors that create or limit
opportunities for immigrants. Discrimination has been identified as one of the main
inhibitors of integration, operating in the economy (Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2016; Dan-
cygier and Laitin 2014), in access to citizenship (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013), and
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in electoral politics (Dancygier et al. 2015). The consequences of political mobilization
have also been considered, and while political mobilization can result in policy that re-
sponds to immigrants’ preferences (Vernby 2013), it can also inhibit social integration by
causing immigrant-native conflict (Dancygier 2010). Alternatively, successful integration
in one area may prevent and hinder integration in another area (Maxwell 2012).
Together, the studies cited above explain the origin of national-level differences in inte-
gration and the mechanisms that facilitate and inhibit integration. However, integration
can also vary substantially within countries. For example, in Germany in 2014, the immi-
grant unemployment rate was six percentage points higher than the native unemployment
rate in the western city of Essen, while in the northern city of Flensburg, the difference
between the two unemployment rates was less than half a percentage point.1 For a full
understanding of integration, it is also necessary to understand variation in integration
within countries. Why do immigrants integrate more successfully in some cities and re-
gions than others? What are the features of a local context that facilitate integration,
and what are the features that inhibit integration?
The process of immigrant integration occurs at the individual level, and as such, it is
significantly impacted by the local context in which an individual operates. These local
contexts, such as, the demographics of immigrant populations, the ideology of local politi-
cians, the strength of the local economy, and natives’ attitudes toward immigrants, shape
immigrants’ opportunities and decisions throughout the course of the integration process.
In this dissertation, I contribute to our understanding of integration by exploring three
ways that local contexts impact the process of integration. The findings not only show
how integration is influenced by structural factors, but also have important implications
for policies ranging from the spatial dispersion of refugees to the political rights granted
to immigrants.
1See Appendix B.1 for data sources.
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1.1 Plan of the dissertation
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 (co-authored with Anna
Piil Damm) investigates the consequences of local partisan government on immigrant
integration. We argue that parties of the left, which are committed to promoting socio-
economic equality and which include immigrants in their constituencies, are likely to
facilitate integration when controlling local government. This contrasts to parties of the
right, which we expect to de-prioritize or even stall integration because of their focus on
reducing government spending and the electoral challenges they face from anti-immigrant
parties. We test the empirical implications of this argument on a sample of refugees
subject to Denmark’s Spatial Dispersion Policy of 1986-1998, which led to the quasi-
random assignment of refugees to municipalities. Our research design allows us to estimate
effects of local government absent the selection bias due to most immigrants’ ability to self-
select into the local contexts most favorable for their integration. Using refugee-level data
from Denmark’s administrative registers, we find that being settled in a left-governed
municipality leads to significantly better integration, as measured by the rate of out-
migration from Denmark. We also find that this effect is conditional on the electoral
context, existing only in municipalities where the left’s electoral majority is secure.
Chapter 3 transitions from studying the elite aspect of local political contexts to the
demographic aspects. In this chapter, I develop an argument that connects levels of
immigrant diversity to the success of integration. My argument states that diverse immi-
grant populations are less likely to be negatively stereotyped, and therefore, less likely to
provoke anti-immigrant attitudes among natives. Integration will then proceed more suc-
cessfully, as anti-immigrant attitudes and discrimination do not prevent immigrants from
fully participating in society. The empirical implications of this argument are that high
levels of immigrant diversity should lead to more successful integration and lower levels of
anti-immigrant attitudes among natives. I test these implications using a combination of
observational and experimental methods. First, I use local-level administrative data from
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Germany and Denmark to assess the impact of diversity on integration. With a dataset of
more than 600 localities covering more than 30 years, I find that immigrant populations
with higher levels of national-origin diversity have lower unemployment rates. Second, I
conduct an original conjoint experiment to a sample of 2,130 Germans to test the effect
of diversity on natives’ attitudes. The conjoint experiment asks respondents to compare
groups of 60 immigrants with varying levels of national-origin country diversity. I find
that attitudes are significantly more positive toward immigrant groups with the highest
level of diversity, supporting the mechanism in this chapter’s argument.
In Chapter 4, I continue to study immigrant demographics, analyzing natives’ attitudes
toward groups of young immigrant men. Young immigrant men have become politically
salient since the 2015 Refugee Crisis in Europe, but little scientific research has been done
to investigate public attitudes toward this group. I identify three possible explanations
for attitudes toward young men. First, attitudes toward young immigrant men may be
positive because of the economic potential of young men. Second, attitudes may be more
negative because of the security threat young men are perceived to pose. Third, attitudes
may also be more negative due to perceptions that young men pose a threat to natives’
culture and way of life. I assess these attitudes using the same conjoint experiment that
was used in Chapter 3, which randomly varied the share of young men in the immigrant
groups in addition to the diversity of immigrant groups. My first result shows that
attitudes toward young men are, on the whole, very negative. The more young men are
in a group, the less favorable natives’ attitudes are toward that group. My second results
support the second two explanations for this negativity: groups with young immigrant
men are perceived as posing a large security threat and cultural threat. In contrast, there
is no evidence that respondents are optimistic about the economic contributions of groups
with many young men.
4
Chapter 2
Local Political Contexts and
Immigrant Integration∗
2.1 Introduction
Immigration has grown substantially in the last 30 years, to the extent that the integration,
or equal and free participation in the social, political, and economic life of the host
country (Dancygier and Laitin 2014), of new arrivals is a chief concern of policy makers
and scholars alike. When successful, integration allows immigration to enrich the life of
the host country (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2017; Maxwell 2017); when
unsuccessful, unemployment, political underrepresentation, and conflict can follow. The
process of integration begins as soon immigrants arrive in the new country, when they
become subject to the laws and policies of their new home. Many of these laws and policies
operate and are created at the national level: for example, the requirements for permanent
residence and citizenship are typically decided in the capital (e.g. Howard 2009). However,
not all of the political responsibility for integration belongs at the national level; much of it
also resides at the local level (Koopmans 2004). Despite local governments’ responsibilities
when it comes to integration policy, we do not know the impact of local politics on
integration.
∗Coauthored with Anna Piil Damm
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Scholars have long focused on understanding the consequences of other elements of
local contexts on integration. For example, natives’ prejudices are known to impede im-
migrants’ access to citizenship (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013), employment (Adida,
Laitin and Valfort 2010), and political representation (Dancygier et al. 2015). The qual-
ities of immigrant’s local social networks are also known to impact integration (Edin,
Fredriksson and A˚slund 2003). Part of the lack of attention given to local political con-
texts likely stems from the difficulty in estimating these effects due to immigrants’ ability
to self-select into contexts which offer them the best chance of success. Several features
of local political contexts, such as the electoral salience of immigrants’ integration in the
community, the share of the public budget dedicated to policies aiding immigrants, and
the responsiveness of local politicians to immigrants’ concerns impact the success or fail-
ure of the integration process. To the extent that immigrants consider these features of
cities and regions when deciding where to live, estimates of the effect of local political
contexts will be confounded by selection bias.
In this study, we deploy a research design which allows us to overcome this selection
bias and to test the consequences of local political contexts on integration. Our empirical
tests make use of a unique natural experiment in refugee location created by Denmark’s
Spatial Dispersion Policy (SDP) of refugees, which ran from 1986-1998. Under the SDP,
refugees were quasi-randomly placed in one of Denmark’s 275 municipalities. These place-
ments were independent of both municipal and refugee preferences; only a small set of
refugee demographics and the availability of suitable housing influenced placement. As
such, we are able to estimate the effect of local political contexts absent confounding
caused by refugee location preferences.
We combine this research design with fine-grained and detailed data drawn from Den-
mark’s administrative registers. The dataset we extract from the registers contains annual
observations of approximately 20,000 refugees subject to the SDP from 1980 to 2012. The
registers contain a wide array of measures, including the demographic traits (age, gender,
national origin, marital status, and number of children) observed during the SDP place-
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ments, plus refugees’ education levels and the durations of their residence in Denmark.
The register data allows us to study integration using individual level behavioral mea-
sures. Together, the SDP and administrative registers give us a unique opportunity to
precisely study the consequences of local political contexts on integration on individual
refugees.
Drawing on theories of partisan effects on spending (Blais, Blake and Dion 1993; Hibbs
1977; Imbeau, Pe´try and Lamari 2001), and political responses to immigration (Bale 2008;
Bloemraad 2013; Meguid 2005), we develop and test an argument about local political
contexts’ impacts on integration. Specifically, we argue that the policy levers available to
local policy makers afford them numerous opportunities to influence integration and that
parties will use these levers to achieve their integration-related policy and electoral goals.
Parties of the left, we predict, have incentives to facilitate integration, as their ideology
emphasizes social justice and openness, and immigrants are often a key part of their
constituency. In contrast, the right’s electoral incentive to be tougher on immigrants and
maintain ideological commitments to limited market intervention will stall integration.
Based on this argument, we predict that integration will be more successful for immigrants
living in municipalities governed by the left.
We focus on one specific integration outcome: out-migration. This outcome reflects
integration across several areas, and allows us to gauge the success or failure of integration
as a whole at the individual level. When refugees decide to leave Denmark, they are
signaling not only that they think their quality of life will be higher in another location,
but also that they are willing to go through the upheaval of further migration in order
to improve their quality of life. This represents a failure of integration in at least one of
the social, economic, or political arenas. Refugees who establish long-term residence in
Denmark, by contrast, are those who have presumably found fulfilling social and economic
lives, which are hallmarks of successful integration.
Our results show a significant impact of local political contexts on integration, indi-
cating that refugees randomly assigned to left-governed municipalities migrate away from
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Denmark at a substantially lower rates. Extending our theoretical argument to consider
of the consequences of electoral competitiveness, we also argue that when left parties are
at risk of losing control of the mayorship they will eschew facilitating integration in order
to secure more votes from natives. The data bears out this prediction as well: the benefi-
cial effects of being settled in a left-governed municipality on integration only exist when
the left is electorally secure.
These findings contribute to the ongoing discussion about integration in multiple ways.
First, by showing that the outcomes of local politics matter for immigrants, our results
add to the ongoing debate about extending citizenship and the right to vote to immigrants
(see Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2017; Vernby 2013). Given that decisions
made in local governments impact immigrants, an inability to influence these decisions
represents a departure from normative ideals of democracy and representation. Second,
the results contribute to our understanding of integration, showing that contextual factors
play an important role in the success of this process. Third, it shows that spatial dispersion
policies, which are commonly used to settle refugees and asylum seekers, are not without
consequence for integration. In effect, these policies can act as a lottery, setting some
refugees up for success and placing roadblocks to success in front of other refugees.
2.2 Theoretical Argument
Previous arguments about local political contexts and immigrant integration have largely
focused on either immigrant input into the system (e.g. Dancygier 2010; Pantoja, Ramirez
and Segura 2001; Vernby 2013) or on parties’ roles as political recruiters (e.g. Bloemraad
2013; Bloemraad and Scho¨nwa¨lder 2013; Dancygier 2013; Dancygier et al. 2015; Togeby
2008). However, local political contexts can also impact immigrant integration through
the policy decisions made by the local government and how accessible the government is
to immigrants.
Local government decisions can impact integration in numerous ways. They influence
the allocation of public funds to schools, health care, transportation, housing, and other
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public goods vital for immigrants. Local governments also have an important role in the
distribution of public housing (Dancygier 2010), and the partisanship of the mayor can
impact local spending (Gerber and Hopkins 2011). Additionally, local parties play an
active role in the local economy by operating extensive vocational education and career
centers that stimulate employment, or by enacting tax breaks that attract businesses and
investment. Governing parties also control the accessibility and responsiveness of the local
government to immigrants through the opening of offices and administrative branches in
immigrant areas (Hopkins 2011) and through the establishment of integration councils
that bring immigrant concerns directly to the ears of local officials.
These decisions impact integration through several channels. Career centers and vo-
cational education help immigrants integrate into the labor market. Adequate public
transportation opens new opportunities for social interactions between immigrants and
natives, prevents immigrants from being physically isolated, and gives immigrants ac-
cess to more jobs. Access to public housing allows immigrants to move to areas with
opportunity and away from deprived neighborhoods. Easily accessed local governments
also make it straightforward for immigrants to obtain benefits to which they are enti-
tled. More broadly, an accessible local government generate trust in the state among
immigrants, leading to better social integration and reducing the potential for conflict.
2.2.1 Consequences of parties’ electoral and policy goals for in-
tegration
Actions local branches of political parties take to accomplish their electoral and policy
goals can have consequences for the degree of success of integration in their communi-
ties. Regarding policy, the ideological leanings of the left are generally more friendly to-
wards integration. Socially, the left is known to favor inclusionary, multi-cultural policies
that emphasize fair treatment of immigrants (Berman 2006; Bale et al. 2010). Economi-
cally, the left is known for defending the welfare state, prioritizing increased employment,
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and generally taking an active role in the economy with the goal of reducing inequality
(Berman 2006; Green-Pedersen, van Kersbergen and Hemerijck 2001; Kitschelt 1994).
Facilitating integration, particularly by reducing the costs associated with labor market
entry, is clearly consistent with these policy goals. In contrast, the right’s ideological
leanings make it less predisposed to aiding integration. On social issues, the right takes
harder lines on immigration (Akkerman 2012; Bale 2003, 2008) and is generally more in
favor of maintaining the traditional native cultural values, while economically it favors
less state intervention in the economy and a less extensive welfare state (Kalyvas and van
Kersbergen 2010). These policy priorities matter, as there is evidence that they are in-
fluential in spending decisions (Blais, Blake and Dion 1993; Hibbs 1977) that can directly
influence immigrants’ quality of life.
Electoral incentives will also push the left and right to handle integration differently
when setting local integration policy. Beyond parties’ belief that accomplishing their pol-
icy goals is key to achieving electoral success, the differing electoral incentives of the left
and right influence how much emphasis they place on helping immigrants integrate. Immi-
grants are often a key part of the left’s electoral constituency at the local level (Dancygier
2010; Garbaye 2005; Togeby 2008), and immigrants’ policy views tend align with the left
(Dancygier and Saunders 2006). Left parties therefore have strong incentives to facilitate
integration and respond to immigrants’ concerns, as doing so can lead to electoral success.
In contrast, the electoral constituencies of parties on the right include voters with more
traditional social values and stronger nationalistic identities, incentivizing these parties
to avoid taking too soft a stance on immigration (Bale 2008). Especially in contexts
where traditional parties of the right are in competition with anti-immigrant parties of
the far-right for a single set of voters, parties of the right have a strong incentive to take
a tough stance toward immigrants and integration (Meguid 2005). When the dominant
integration paradigm is one of assimilation over multiculturalism (Koopmans 2013), the
electoral incentives to avoid the appearance of prioritizing immigrants at the expense of
natives become even stronger.
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Tying electoral and policy motivations together, parties of the left and right have dif-
ferent priorities when addressing integration. Left parties are motivated to direct resources
to immigrants, either directly through cash transfers or the allocation of public housing
or through programs which directly benefit immigrants, such as the opening of job centers
and new schools. In doing so, they stand to please both their native constituency, which
has liberal social values and favors social justice, and an immigrant constituency, which
wants the party to meet its needs (Vernby 2013). The left’s policies, therefore, should lead
to more successful integration. The opposite is expected for parties of the right. They
will be hesitant to direct scarce resources towards immigrants and will have less direct
motivation to be especially responsive to immigrants. Consequently, immigrants living
in municipalities governed by the right will have more difficulty integrating, as there will
be fewer resources directed to them as well as less incentive for the government to re-
spond to immigrant concerns. In sum, our argument states that local politics matters for
the success of integration, and predicts that the policy and electoral goals of left parties
means that immigrants living in municipalities governed by the left are more likely to
successfully integrate.
2.3 Research Design
To identify the effects of local political contexts, we leverage a natural experiment in
immigrant location created by Denmark’s Spatial Dispersion Policy (SDP) of refugees, in
effect from 1986-1998.1 This policy was a response to the increasing in-flow of refugees to
Denmark in the 1980s and the limits of the housing stock in Copenhagen, many refugees’
preferred destination. Under the SDP, refugees were randomly placed in municipalities
conditional on several refugee demographic traits, all of which we observe and include in
our analysis. Importantly, information about education, job skills, income, or language
abilities was not available to officials making the placements. Further, refugees’ individual
location preferences were not considered in the placement process, nor were municipalities’
1We describe the SDP in detail in Appendix A.1.
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preferences regarding refugees considered.
Placement through the SDP obviates concerns about selection bias that would hamper
an analysis where refugees can self-select into municipalities. Specifically, as unobservable
integration potential is independent of the decision to reside in a certain local political
context, we can identify the effects of local contextual factors. However, the SDP did not
require refugees to live in the municipality of assignment for an extended period. Some
refugees would have stayed in their assigned municipalities for several years after arrival,
while others would have moved shortly after arrival. For this reason, our results do not
reflect the effect of living in a certain context for a number of years consecutively. Instead,
our results reflect the consequences of living under certain conditions in the initial period
after immigration. This initial period is critical: initial delays in the integration process
can have deleterious consequences for long term integration(Hainmueller, Hangartner and
Lawrence 2016). Local political contexts’ impacts, therefore, are likely to be largest in
the period immediately after settlement.
2.3.1 Local Government and Parties in Denmark
Municipalities are the lowest level of government in Denmark. In the time-period we study,
there were 275 municipalities in Denmark. Each municipality was run by a municipal
council, which acted as a legislative body, and a mayor. Mayors were not directly elected,
but rather were chosen by a majority of the local council. These local councils varied
in size from 9 to 55 seats, and were filled through elections occurring every four years.
The municipalities had considerable political autonomy and were responsible for a wide
variety of tasks. Among other things, they were in charge of spending in the local schools,
implementing of social security programs, and setting income and property tax levels
(Christoffersen and Paldam 2003; Harmon 2015). These responsibilities gave municipal
governments numerous opportunities to take actions impacting the course of integration
in their municipalities.
In Denmark, the main political parties at the national level are also the main parties
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at the municipal level. The parties occupy a variety of positions on the traditional left-
right scale. They are, as follows: left : Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s
Party; Center: the Radical Liberals and Center Democrats; center right: Venstre and
the Conservative People’s Party; far-right: the Progress Party and the Danish People’s
Party. Additionally, unaligned independent politicians often win seats on local councils
and hold mayorships. The ideology of these independent local politicians varies, and they
can occupy positions along the ideological scale. Considered as a whole, the Danish party
system is quite typical of European democracies: small parties exist on the far left, far
right, and center, while two larger parties (the Social Democrats and Venstre) occupy
positions at the center left and center right. As such, the inferences from this paper
should carry over to other systems.2
Similar to other European countries, Denmark has seen a large increase in its immi-
grant population in the last 30 years. From 1980 through 2010 the percentage of immi-
grants in the population rose from 3% to 12%, with immigrants originating primarily from
the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the (former) Yugoslavia. Many of the immigrants
arriving in Denmark during this period were asylum seekers: almost 80,000 people were
granted asylum in Denmark between 1986 and 1998. Integrating these new arrivals has
been a challenge for Denmark. Electorally, difficulties in integration have helped fuel the
rise and success of the Danish People’s Party. In terms of policy, challenges in integra-
tion have lead Denmark to revise their integration policies, with the largest change being
the 1999 integration law, which ended the SDP and required new refugees to actively
participate in integration programs to receive public benefits from the state.
2To the extent that party competition in Denmark is unique, it is due to the fact that there is little dif-
ference between the center-right and center-left on many economic issues. This fact should work against
finding the results we do because there may be only minimal difference in the policies implemented by
the left and right. In contexts with starker differences between left and right, we therefore expect the
impact of local political contexts on integration to be even larger.
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2.3.2 Data and Variables
The data for this study comes primarily from Statistics Denmark’s administrative reg-
isters. These individual level registers contain time-series observations for demographic,
social, political, and economic indicators. Notably, the individual level registers can be
linked by a unique identification number assigned to all legal residents of Denmark, in-
cluding refugees. These detailed data allow us to construct very precise measures of our
integration variables and use individual refugees as units of analysis. We complement
these individual level data with municipal level data from a variety of public sources.
From the population of refugees entering Denmark in the SDP era, we extract a sample
of 19,314 refugees. We follow Damm and Dustmann (2014) in constructing our sample of
refugees.3 Eight origin countries are represented in our sample: Afghanistan, Ethiopia,
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon (including Palestinians), Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Together,
refugees from these eight countries accounted for more than 86% of the total number of
permanent residence permits granted to refugees between 1985 and 1997. We exclude
refugees whose initial municipality of residence was Copenhagen, because refugees who
opted out of the SDP likely moved to Copenhagen. Further, we include our sample
includes only the head of household, defined as the spouse arriving in Denmark first for
couples, because our main outcome variables focuses on migration, which is a decision
families typically make together.
We measure several demographic characteristics of refugees: Gender (an indicator for
female), Origin Country, Immigration Age (in years), Immigration Year, Marital Status
(an indicator for married) and Number of Children and Educational Attainment (un-
known, 0-9, 10-12, or 13+ years). We use Education Attainment as a proxy for “inte-
gration potential,” as education can be advantageous in the integration process. As this
variable was unobserved by the SDP placement officials, we use it below to carry out
a randomization check. Finally, we also measure log(Ethnic Stock) as the number of a
3See Appendix A.2 for more details on the construction of our sample.
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refugee’s co-nationals living in Denmark in the year of arrival.4
Measuring integration is not straightforward, because integration, as a concept, is very
broad: it includes the social, cultural, political, and economic aspects of immigrants’s lives.
As such, no single measure can plausibly capture all aspects of integration, and in many
cases, there may be tradeoffs between types of integration (e.g. Hainmueller, Hangartner
and Pietrantuono 2017; Maxwell 2012). In our analysis, we measure integration through
a refugee’s length of residence in Denmark. We consider shorter stays to represent un-
successful integration because the decision to leave Denmark indicates a belief that life
would be better in another country. Given that migrating can be very costly, and requires
bearing both economic and social costs, only when a refugee is highly dissatisfied with
his/her life in Denmark would the upheaval of migrating again be worthwhile. Such a case
clearly represents failed integration: refugees that decide to leave are likely outside the
labor market, socially isolated, or more generally do not feel a sense of belonging in Den-
mark. In contrast, establishing a long-term residence is not only a symbol of successful
integration (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2017), but is also associated with
greater future integration (White et al. 2008) and is often necessary for the acquisition of
citizenship. For these reasons, understanding why and when refugees leave Denmark is
important for understanding integration more generally.
Based on these arguments, the main outcome variable in our analyses is Out-Migration.
We define this as the number of years a refugee stays in Denmark before out-migrating.5
This variable is right censored at 10 years for all refugees who stay in Denmark at least
10 years. We make this decision because we are interested in the consequences of initial
political contexts, the effects of which we do not expect to impact migration decisions
indefinitely.6
To measure the political context, we create two variables. First is Left Mayor, a dummy
indicating whether the mayorship is held by the Social Democrats or the Socialist People’s
4Data on the number of co-nationals comes from table BEF3 at Statistics’ Denmark’s StatBank.
5Operationalized as years until a refugee no longer appears in the administrative registers.
6Our main results are robust to the use of 5 and 15 year periods as well.
15
Party.7 With this measure, we can clearly identify which party holds the executive branch
of local government. There is little variation in this variable, as elections only occur every
four years and in many municipalities, the same party holds the mayorship for several
terms. For this reason, we also measure the local political context with Left Seat Share,
the percentage of seats on the local council held by the Social Democrats and the Socialist
People’s Party among those held by the Social Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party,
Venstre, and the Conservative People’s Party. The advantages of this variable are that it
changes from election to election regardless of who holds the mayorship, and that it is a
more fine-grained measure of the strength of left parties in the local government.
We measure several other municipal characteristics at the time of a refugee’s arrival in
Denmark to account for the local opportunity structure more generally.8 Log(Population),
and % Immigrant Population measure municipal demographics. Unemployment Rate
measures unemployment as those in the labor force without employment among all resi-
dents of a municipality (Danes and immigrants). % Rental Housing is the percentage of
rental housing among total housing; municipalities with more rental housing likely offer
more opportunities for refugees to find adequate housing for relocating their initial settle-
ment, which can help refugees succeed in the labor market. Finally, Far Right Vote Share
measures support for Denmarks’ two anti-immigrant parties, the Progress Party and the
Danish People’s Party, in elections for the national parliament.9 This variable proxies the
level of anti-immigrant sentiment among natives, and is measured using national election
results so that it does not also measure local political issues. By accounting for local
anti-immigrant sentiment, we are able to separate our explanation – the effects of local
politics – from local attitudes towards refugees.
7Data from the Mayor Facts (Borgmester Fakta) database of the the magazine Kommuner. Data available
at www.kommuner.dk/borgmesterfakta.
8Data for these measures comes from StatBank unless otherwise noted.
9Data is from the Danish Elections Database, available at valgdata.ps.au.dk.
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2.3.3 Empirical Approach
To explore the role of local political contexts on the duration of refugee residences in
Denmark, we fit a series of Cox proportional hazard models. Event history models are
appropriate for our study, which is interested in both whether an event occurs (leaving
Denmark) and when (how many years after arrival) that event occurs. We prefer the Cox
proportional hazard model in particular as it does not require us to make any assump-
tions about the shape of the survival function. Our models include the full set of refugee
characteristics, municipal controls, and one of our two political contextual variables. We
also cluster standard errors by municipality. The coefficients from these Cox proportional
hazard models tell us how our variables impact the hazard rate, which is probability of
leaving Denmark at any given time. A positive coefficient indicates that a variable in-
creases the likelihood of moving away from Denmark, while a negative coefficient indicates
that a variable increases the probability of staying in Denmark.
2.3.4 Randomization Check
Before presenting our main results, we perform a randomization check to probe the va-
lidity of the SDP as a natural experiment. We regress, one at a time, our municipal
level variables on the observable refugee characteristics plus education, which was un-
observable to the officials implementing the SDP, but is observable to us thanks to the
administrative registers. Our expectation is that we should find no strong relationships
between municipality characteristics and refugee education levels. These models are OLS
regressions including entry year and origin country fixed effects and our full set of refugee
demographics.
Table 2.1 displays the results of these regressions, with each column representing one of
our different municipal level variables. The coefficients for the variables observable to the
refugee council show some reliable relationships. For instance, families with more children
were more likely to be placed in smaller cities with smaller immigrant populations. This
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is likely due to the lack of housing suitable for large families in large cities. There is
also evidence that the officials implementing the SDP took gender, age, and ethnic stock
into account in making placements, with older, female, refugees with larger ethnic stock
being more likely to be placed in larger, more immigrant dense municipalities governed
by the left. These correlations are consistent with the SDP as a natural experiment, as
this information was observed by the officials making placements.
The key variable in this randomization check is Eduction for two reasons: 1) it is
a a proxy for integration potential, as highly educated refugees have more skills that
can be used in the labor market, and 2) because it was not observed by the refugee
council during the placement process. Consequently, education should not be correlated
with municipal characteristics under our interpretation of the SDP. For the non-political
municipal characteristics, none of the education coefficients returns a substantive and
statistically significant effect. For the three political variables, the coefficients largely
indicate education is indeed unrelated to the political context. The one exception comes
from refugees with with unknown education levels, who are 2.2% more likely to be placed
in municipalities with left mayors. On the whole, education has no substantive relationship
with municipal characteristics, which is evidence that the SDP randomly sorted refugees
into municipalities across Denmark.
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Table 2.1: Randomization Check for Refugees Subject to the SDP
log(Population) %
Immigrants
Unemployment
Rate
% Rental
Housing
Left Mayor Left Seat % Far Right
Vote %
Married 0.022 −0.000 0.000 −0.003 −0.002 −0.001 −0.000
(0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.00)
Children −0.044∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.002∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Age 0.004∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.000∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log(Ethnic Stock) 0.097∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.000 0.014∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.000)
Gender 0.060∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.009∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.005∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.0008) (0.002) (0.000)
Years of eduction (ref. category: 0-9 years):
10-12 years 0.028 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.001 −0.000
(0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.000)
13+ years −0.051 −0.000 −0.000 −0.005 −0.004 −0.000 0.001
(0.031) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.001)
Unknown 0.006 0.001∗ 0.001 0.005 0.022∗ 0.006∗ −0.001
(0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.000)
Intercept 9.872∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.046) (0.013) (0.002)
Origin F.E.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Year F.E.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
R2 0.082 0.205 0.403 0.091 0.043 0.073 0.494
N 19,387
Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficient entries with standard errors in parentheses. The sample for these models is the refugee household
head sample. 0-9 years is the excluded category for the education. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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2.4 Does a Left Government Improve Integration?
Table 2.2 reports the results of two Cox proportional hazard models of out-migration from
Denmark. As can be seen, the estimates for both Left Mayor and Left Seat Share are
negative and statistically reliable in both models. This indicates that refugees’ migration
decisions responded to who governed locally. To assess the substantive importance of
these effects, we consider how they alter the hazard rate, which is the probability of a
refugee moving away from Denmark in any given year. For Left Mayor, our estimate
suggests that being assigned to a left-governed municipality reduces the probability of
leaving in any given year by approximately 10%. The estimates also suggest that the
hazard rate declines by about 6% if a refugee is assigned to a municipality where the left’s
seat share on the local council is one standard deviation (.12) higher than the mean (.56).
These are substantial effects.
Turning to the municipal level controls, we see that they have little impact on the
outcome variable. The only variable that returns a statistically significant estimate in
either model is % Immigrants, which indicates that refugees are more likely to move
away from Denmark when they are settled in large pre-existing immigrant communities.
The other estimates suggest that refugees are more likely to move away from Denmark
when they are settled in larger municipalities, in municipalities with more support for far
right parties, and in municipalities with high unemployment rates, although none of these
estimates are significant at conventional levels.
In evaluating the empirical implications of our theory, two Cox proportional hazard
models have shown that refugees respond to the local political context in their migration
decisions. Specifically, refugees randomly assigned to left-governed municipalities by the
SDP are less likely to leave Denmark in the intervening ten years. This effect is substan-
tively meaningful, changing the probability of exiting Denmark by 10% in any given year,
and exists when considering both who controls the mayorship and the share of seats held
by the left on the local council.
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Table 2.2: The Effect of Political Context on Out-Migration
Model 1 Model 2
Left Mayor −0.107∗
(0.050)
Left Seat Share −0.422∗
(0.196)
Far Right National Vote 2.192 2.142
(1.73) (1.203)
log(Population) 0.025 0.014
(0.029) (0.028)
% Immigrants 3.502∗∗ 3.469∗∗
(1.205) (1.173)
Unemployment Rate 0.090 0.401
(1.174) (1.192)
% Rental Housing −0.018 0.069
(0.297) (0.295)
Individual Controls
√ √
Origin F.E.
√ √
Year F.E.
√ √
AIC 77,188 77,188
N 19,387 19,387
Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficients from Cox proportional hazard models with stan-
dard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
2.5 Do Competitive Local Politics Hamper Integra-
tion?
Part of our argument about the impact of local politics on integration is that parties
of the the left have an electoral incentive to hear and respond to refugees’ concerns, as
these groups form part of the left’s constituency. Extending this logic, we further argue
that left parties’ incentive to actively seek out support from refugee voters is contingent
on the level of electoral competition in a municipality. When electoral competitiveness
is high, meaning that small changes in vote share can determine which party gets to
occupy the mayor’s office, maximizing vote share becomes more important for parties.
Parties attention will subsequently be drawn toward crucial swing voters, whose support
can make all the difference, but whose vote choice can be impacted of relations between
immigrants and natives (Dancygier 2013). In this case, the left must choose between
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continuing the behaviors which have helped immigrants integrate well buy may lead the
left to losing office, or adopting a more nativist stance that appeals to a broader segment
of the electorate and results in the left’s continuing control of the mayorship. We argue
that parties will choose the latter, given the value of holding office for achieving their
policy goals. The beneficial effects of left governments on integration should, therefore,
be curtailed in contexts where the left is electorally vulnerable.
We test this extension to the argument by fitting two additional versions of our main
model that account for the possible conditioning effects of competitiveness. To do this,
we created a new variable, Competitive, which is an indicator for whether the seat share
of the left is between 45% and 55%.10 We operationalize competitiveness in this way
because the mayor is elected by a majority of the local council, and hence, municipalities
where the left has either just barely above or below half of the seats will be ones where
slight changes in seat share can alter control of the mayorship. Our first specification
in this section includes all municipalities, and allows the effect of Left Mayor to vary
between competitive and non-competitive municipalities. Our second specification in this
section considers the effect of Competitive when considering left-governed municipalities
in isolation.
Table 2.3 shows the results of these two models. The estimates indicate that there are
indeed different processes at work in municipalities where the left is electorally secure and
in those where it is not. Our interaction model has a negative and statistically significant
coefficient for Left Mayor and a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the
interaction between Left Mayor and Competitive. This indicates that initial residence in
a left municipality decreases the probability of leaving Denmark, but that this probability
increases in competitive municipalities. The second model, including only left-governed
municipalities, shows a similar result. Competitive has the expected sign and is statisti-
cally significant. To ease the interpretation of our interaction model, we calculated the
marginal effect of Left Mayor on the hazard rate for both competitive and non-competitive
10Our results are robust to considering bands of competitiveness as tight as 47-52.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Out-Migration
Model 1 Model 2
Left Mayor −0.196∗∗
(0.061)
Competitive −0.129 0.145∗∗
(0.072) (0.054)
Left Mayor × Competitive 0.259∗∗
(0.086)
Far Right National Vote 2.303∗ 4.667∗∗
(1.167) (1.649)
log(Population) 0.024 0.032
(0.029) (0.033)
% Immigrants 3.008∗ 3.425∗∗
(1.190) (1.315)
Unemployment Rate 0.363 −0.128
(1.125) (1.471)
% Rental Housing 0.168 0.378
(0.300) (0.372)
Individual Controls
√ √
Origin F.E.
√ √
Year F.E.
√ √
AIC 77,182 51,558
N 19,387 13,339
Note: Cell entries represent unstandardized coefficients from Cox proportional hazard models with stan-
dard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
municipalities along with their respective 95% confidence intervals. These are shown in
Table 2.4. As can be seen, the effect of Left Mayor in non-competitive contexts is to
decrease the hazard rate, or probability of moving away in any given year, by about
18%. In contrast, the estimated effect of Left Mayor in competitive municipalities is to
increase the hazard rate, although this estimate is not statistically distinguishable from
the baseline hazard rate (non-left, non-competitive municipalities).
These results point to a strong electoral logic connecting local politics and refugee
integration. While our earlier results indicated that on balance, refugees tend to stay
in Denmark longer when settled in left-governed municipalities, these results show that
electoral politics play a key role in this relationship. When the left holds the mayorship
without a comfortable electoral cushion, its impact on the rate of refugee out-migration
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Table 2.4: Marginal Effects of Left Mayor
Marginal Effect 95% CI
Non Competitive 0.822 [0.730, 0.925]
Competitive 1.065 [0.918, 1.236]
Note: Calculations based on estimates from Model 1, Table 2.3.
Effects refer to change from baseline hazard rate.
disappears. This likely occurred because left parties in these municipalities, facing greater
scrutiny from native voters in their handling of refugees, were less committed to expend-
ing scare resources and attention on helping refugees integrate. Such hesitation in helping
refugees in the face of great scrutiny is sensible in the Danish context, where the assimi-
lationist view of integration (Koopmans 2013; Togeby 2004) would lead natives to oppose
specific recognition of minority groups by the local government.
2.6 Conclusion
The characteristics of the cities, regions, and countries immigrants arrive in can play
an important role in determining how integration proceeds. When a location offers op-
portunities for economic advancement, limits social isolation, and provides a responsive
political process, the process of integration can be made much easier. The consequences
of successful integration are numerous: for example, it can lead to less poverty, less crime,
and better relations between immigrants and natives. In this paper, we explain and show
how local politics directly affects integration. We argue that local governments have both
the opportunity and the motivation to create and implement policies in ways that can
hinder or advance integration. The testable implication of our argument is that left par-
ties – due to the their commitment to social equality and the inclusion of immigrants in
their electoral coalition – will govern in a way that facilities immigrant integration. Using
micro data on refugees in Denmark and leveraging the Danish Spatial Dispersion Policy
of 1986-1998, we find evidence that local politics indeed impact integration. However,
this effect depends on more than just who is in power – the beneficial effects of leftist
government are dependent on the left having a secure majority in the local council.
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Our use of the Spatial Dispersion Policy as an identification strategy represents an
important development in studying how contextual variables can impact integration.
Through this natural experiment, we are able to causally identify the effects of municipal
characteristics on integration. Without it, efforts to study the important consequences of
local characteristics are inevitably hampered by confounding resulting from immigrants’
location choices. We hope that our use of the Spatial Dispersion Policy will spur further
research leveraging dispersal policies, as similar policies have been implemented in the
United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden. Further, we note that while we have been able
to identify the effect of government partisanship, our tests are not able to fully explore
the mechanisms connecting party government and integration. This will be an important
direction for further research.
Our paper makes an important contribution to the literature on immigrant integration
by showing individual-level impacts of the local political context. Previous scholarship
has often focused on “political opportunity structures,” and has shown how more open
or closed contexts can limit immigrant groups’ engagement with the political process
and the voicing of immigrant concerns. Our paper adds to this literature by showing
clear evidence that arguably the most important element of the local political context,
the parties and politicians in political office, impact integration. Further, we make a
contribution by focusing on individual immigrants and their choices. For immigrants,
being able to establish a long-term and stable residence in a city or region is important.
Additionally, our study represents an important contribution by looking at a large number
of cities, allowing us to rule out other explanations, such as the local economic context or
the composition of the immigrant community.
More generally, our study shows that what happens in elections, even at the local
level, can have real and important consequences for immigrants. As immigration becomes
an increasingly important political issue in Europe and North America, the impact of
elections on immigrants themselves is likely to only increase. When parties favorable
toward immigrants and immigration succeed, immigrants can expect integration to be
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less challenging and their opportunities to be more abundant. However, when parties
opposed to immigration succeed, there are reasons to think the negative consequences for
immigrant populations will be non-trivial. Our study has only examined the distinctions
between left and right wing parties; we have not studied the consequences of the election
and inclusion in government of explicitly anti-immigrant parties on integration. However,
given these parties’ often extreme positions, it is likely that our theoretical argument will
extend to them.
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Chapter 3
Immigrant Diversity, Native
Attitudes, and Immigrant
Integration
3.1 Introduction
Rapid growth in the size and diversity of immigrant populations has pushed immigrant
integration to the top of the policy agenda in many developed democracies. Much is at
stake in the integration process: when integration succeeds, and barriers to the full and
equal participation of immigrants are removed (Kymlicka 1995), the economic potential of
migration can be realized, benefiting natives and immigrants alike (Dancygier and Laitin
2014). Unfortunately, integration often falls far short of this goal. Instead, immigrants are
marginalized, suffering from discrimination (Dancygier and Laitin 2014; Hainmueller and
Hopkins 2014), political underrepresentation (Dancygier et al. 2015), and social exclusion
(Algan et al. 2012). More visibly, integration failures can lead to violent conflict and
rioting (Dancygier 2010), such as the 2005 riots in France (Mucchielli 2009). These
outcomes are normatively troubling, running counter to the ideals of democratic society.
Unsurprisingly, scholars have dedicated substantial attention to the causes of both
failed and successful integration. On the failure side, an important factor preventing inte-
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gration is the persistently high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes among natives (Dancy-
gier and Donnelly 2013; Fetzer 2000; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Malhotra, Margalit
and Mo 2013), based on fears that immigrants will harm their security, or cultural or
economic status. These attitudes manifest themselves in discrimination across numerous
areas, such as employment (Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2010; Dancygier and Laitin 2014),
political representation (Dancygier et al. 2015), and access to citizenship (Hainmueller
and Hangartner 2013). On the success side, naturalization has been hailed as a pathway
to integration (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2015, 2017; Just and Anderson
2012), while the beneficial effects of granting immigrants the right to vote has also been
shown (Vernby 2013).
While scholars have given integration a thorough treatment, they have paid much
less attention to the demographic composition of immigrant populations. Apart from
size (e.g. Dancygier 2010; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Hopkins 2010; Quillian 1995; Togeby
1999), the consequences of immigrant population characteristics on integration are rel-
atively unknown. Yet, immigrant groups vary significantly in how similar or different
they are in terms of ethnicity and origin country, as well as other demographics. How
do the characteristics of an immigrant population impact the success of integration? Do
homogeneous or diverse groups of immigrants integrate better? Do they face more or less
antagonism by natives? Because immigrants are often settled in groups, understanding
the consequences of group composition is highly relevant for policymakers and scholars
alike who are interested in successful integration.
In this chapter, I argue that the characteristics of an immigrant population, specif-
ically the level of diversity within a group of immigrants, influence integration success.
Diversity matters because it depresses anti-immigrant attitudes among natives, thereby
reducing discrimination. Specifically, diversity - in terms of religion, language, ethnicity,
national origin, age, gender, education levels or other characteristics - repeatedly exposes
natives to signals that the outgroup is heterogeneous and thereby counteracts a process
of exaggerated out-group homogeneity that drives negative stereotyping (Hilton and von
28
Hippel 1996). Given that negative stereotypes are a known cause of anti-immigrant at-
titudes (Stephen, Ybarra and Bachman 1999), inhibiting them reduces such attitudes.
Diversity’s beneficial effects have the potential to be both substantial and sustaining. Re-
ducing discrimination in hiring can lead to naturalization (Hainmueller and Hangartner
2013) and social acceptance by natives (Maxwell 2017), and reducing discrimination by
political parties when nominating candidates can lead to greater political representation
of immigrants (Dancygier et al. 2015).
My argument produces empirical implications that I test with both observational
and experimental methods. First, I use local-level administrative data from Germany
and Denmark to test the prediction that immigrant diversity leads to better integration.
In recent decades, both countries have experienced large-scale immigration in the form
of guest workers, refugees and asylum seekers, and intra-EU migrants. These various
migration inflows have led to substantial diversity across regions and time. My main
finding is that this diversity matters: localities with more successful integration also have
higher levels of origin-country diversity. I also leverage the opening of the Øresund Bridge
between Denmark and Sweden - a positive shock to integration in the Copenhagen area
- to show that causality does not run from integration success to diversity.
The second prediction of my argument is that diversity reduces anti-immigrant at-
titudes. I test this prediction experimentally by conducting a conjoint experiment in
Germany. In the conjoint study, respondents were asked to evaluate groups of 60 immi-
grants that vary randomly across three levels of origin-country diversity. Importantly, the
randomization of diversity is designed so that the overall level of diversity is independent
of the number of immigrants from any single origin-country. This ensures that attitudes
toward the origin-countries included in the survey do not bias the estimate of diversity’s
effect. The results show a positive effect of diversity: respondents have more favorable
attitudes toward more diverse groups of immigrants.
This study makes several contributions. First, these results compliment earlier find-
ings about how specific groups of immigrants integrate (e.g. Dancygier 2010) by showing
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that the success of one immigrant group depends on the other immigrant groups in a
community. It also suggests that policy makers could proactively facilitate integration
by considering pre-existing levels of immigrant diversity in a community when deciding
which immigrants to admit and where to settle them. Second, this study develops a
theory which directly links explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes with explanations of
integration. These topics have often been studied separately, despite the clear linkages
between them. Third, this study contributes to our understanding of how diversity af-
fects social cohesion. Prior work focuses primarily on the diversity between natives and
immigrants, and warns that such diversity leads to social capital loss and social conflict
(Putnam 2007). In contrast, I show that diversity within immigrants has the opposite
effect, leading to more out-group tolerance and improved integration. Finally, previous
studies have shown that immigrant diversity increases quality of life and economic pro-
ductivity for natives (Akay et al. 2017; Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport 2016); the current
study shows that immigrants benefit from diversity in these ways as well.
3.2 Integration and Native Attitudes
Discrimination is a key impediment to immigrant integration across numerous areas (Dan-
cygier and Laitin 2014). In employment, correspondence tests have shown applications
with immigrant names receive fewer callbacks than applications with native names (e.g.
Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2014). In electoral politics, immigrants are prevented by party
leaders (Dancygier et al. 2015) and voters (Dancygier 2013) from gaining access to rep-
resentation. Similarly, access to citizenship for immigrants is impeded by discrimination
based on origin countries (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013). Preventing discrimination
against immigrants is therefore critical for their successful integration.
A large share of this discrimination can be explained by anti-immigrant attitudes
among natives. Explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes have typically focused on the
type or level of threat posed by immigrants. Some authors emphasize socio-cultural
threats (e.g. Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hop-
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kins 2015; Sides and Citrin 2007), arguing that natives’ anxiety over perceived cultural
changes caused by inflows of immigrants drives anti-immigrant attitudes. Others argue
that the economic threat posed by immigrants is the main driver of anti-immigrant atti-
tudes (e.g. Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Malhotra, Margalit and Mo 2013; Scheve and
Slaughter 2001). Scholars have further argued that immigrant population levels (Quillian
1995) and changes (Hopkins 2010), as well as immigrants’ internal cohesion (Dancygier
2010) all condition natives’ threat levels.
Underpinning these perceptions of threat are natives’ negative stereotypes about im-
migrants, which have been linked to anti-immigrant attitudes (Burns and Gimpel 2000;
McLaren 2003; Pe´rez 2010). Research in social psychology supports this argument, show-
ing that negative stereotyping is an antecedent to the types of threats – either realistic
(over scare resources) or symbolic (over values) – that drive negative outgroup attitudes
(Stephen et al. 2002; Riek, Mania and Gaertner 2006). Hence, negative stereotyping
of immigrants fuels anti-immigrant attitudes and discrimination, limiting the success of
immigrant integration.
3.3 Stereotyping and Immigrant Diversity
The development of negative stereotypes is a psychological process, but also depends on
an individual’s encounters with members of an outgroup and the characteristics of an
outgroup. There are two processes of particular relevance. First, stereotypes can develop
through subconscious detection of covariation. This type of stereotype development oc-
curs when an individual subconsciously detects a correlation between behaviors or values
and group membership (Hill et al. 1990; Hilton and von Hippel 1996), and can persist
even if the initial correlation vanishes. Second, stereotyping can be the result of a ten-
dency to perceive out-group members as more homogenous (Park, Judd and Ryan 1991;
Simon and Mummendey 1990), thereby attributing the behaviors and values of a single
outgroup member to all outgroup members. Perceptions of out-group homogeneity have
been directly linked with both stereotyping, as well as prejudice and discrimination (Diehl
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and Jonas 1991; Hilton and von Hippel 1996; Quattrone 1986).
These processes are relevant because they suggest ways in which stereotyping can
prevented, and hence, anti-immigrant attitudes could be reduced. Importantly, both pro-
cesses depend on the actual characteristics of the outgroup being stereotyped. First,
the (subconscious) detection of correlations between outgroup membership and behav-
iors/values is less likely when members of an outgroup are more distinct from one another.
Similarly, the outgroup homogeneity effect is known to be attenuated when outgroup
members are easily categorized into subgroups (Park, Ryan and Judd 1992). Contrasts
between ingroup and outgroup homogeneity also matter: when the outgroup is more
heterogenous than the ingroup, stereotyping decreases (Simon et al. 1990).
Applied to the context of natives’ attitudes toward immigrants, this discussion sug-
gests that more heterogeneous or diverse immigrant communities will be subject to less
stereotyping than their more homogenous counterparts. Natives will be less likely to sub-
consciously detect correlations when interacting with diverse immigrant communities, as
these interactions are more likely to be varied. Similarly, diverse immigrant communities
will be more easily categorized into subgroups, attenuating the outgroup homogeneity
effect. Both of these effects will reduce stereotyping and anti-immigrant attitudes.
Several forms of immigrant diversity should produce these effects. Diversity in those
traits along which group identities are typically formed should have the strongest effect
on reducing stereotyping. These are traits such as national origin, race, religion, and lan-
guage. However, any form of diversity which increases the variety of interactions natives
have with immigrants or allows for natives to perceive more subgroups among immigrants
should also reduce stereotyping. Heterogeneity in ages, vocations, and education levels
could reduce negative stereotyping. Furthermore, as these effects depend on natives’
personal experiences with immigrants, diversity at the local (rather than national) level,
should matter the most (see also Hopkins 2010; Newman 2013). It is at this level where
natives have the opportunity to interact with immigrants during everyday activities such
as commuting, working, and leisure.
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3.4 Empirical Implications
To summarize, the argument presented above connects immigrant diversity and inte-
gration through the mechanism of reduced anti-immigrant attitudes. More specifically, I
argue that immigrant diversity impedes the development of negative stereotypes, reducing
anti-immigrant attitudes. Reducing anti-immigrant attitudes, in turn, prevents discrimi-
nation and allows integration to succeed. I also argue that the effect of diversity should
be especially strong at the local level, where immigrants and natives are in closest con-
tact. This argument produces two observable empirical implications for the relationship
between immigrant diversity and both anti-immigrant attitudes and integration.
The primary implication of my argument is that higher levels of immigrant diversity
will lead to more successful integration. This prediction contributes to the literature
on within-country determinants of integration describing how immigrant demographics
can matter for integration beyond the total number of immigrants (e.g. Dancygier 2013;
Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; de Graauw and Vermeulen 2016) or the characteristics
of specific groups of immigrants (Dancygier 2010; Eggert and Pilati 2014; Fennema and
Tillie 1999; Michon and Vermeulen 2013). It also contrasts with other studies of diversity,
which focus on diversity’s impact on natives’ or the entire population, rather than its
impact on immigrants (e.g. Akay et al. 2017; Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport 2016).
The secondary empirical implication of my argument that higher levels of immigrant
diversity will lead to reduced anti-immigrant attitudes. This prediction follows other
studies investigating the impact of immigrants’ attributes on native attitudes (Bansak,
Hainmueller and Hangartner 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hopkins 2015; Turper
et al. 2015). However, it diverges from these studies in that it shifts the focus away from
individual immigrants to groups of immigrants. Given that immigrants often arrive and
are settled in groups, this shift of focus is relevant and helps deepen our understanding
of anti-immigrant sentiment.
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3.5 Research Design
In this chapter, I test my theory’s primary empirical implication – that diversity has a
positive effect on integration – by analyzing local level administrative data from Germany
and Denmark. Performing the analysis at the local level, as opposed to the regional or
national levels, has multiple advantages. First, it maximizes the fit to the theoretical
argument, which emphasizes the consequences of natives’ personal observations of im-
migrants in their local communities. Second, comparing within countries holds several
confounding variables constant, most notably citizenship regimes (see Goodman 2010;
Howard 2009) and integration frameworks (e.g. multiculturalism vs. assimilation, see
Koopmans 2013). The downside of a within-country test is that it limits external validity
and generalizability, especially if it is the case that integration operates idiosyncratically
in the test country. By investigating two countries, Germany and Denmark, my design
lowers this risk.
Both the size of the immigrant population and the level of immigrant integration,
measured through the ratio of foreign to native unemployment, in Germany and Denmark
suggest that these countries are not outliers in terms of immigration. The foreign-born
populations in Germany and Denmark accounted for 12.8 and 8.5 percent of the total
population in 2013, respectively, placing their immigrant populations very close to the
OECD median of 12.7% (OECD 2017a). In the same year, the ratio of foreign-born
unemployment to native-born unemployment in these two countries was also similar to
other developed countries: 1.69 in Germany and 1.91 in Denmark, compared to an OECD
median of 1.39 and a European median of 1.63 (OECD 2017b,c). Thus, inferences drawn
from Germany and Denmark should be generalizable to other contexts.
An additional benefit of studying Germany and Denmark is that these countries vary
across several other dimensions which have the potential to impact integration. This
further serves to increase generalizability. First, immigration has long been a salient po-
litical issue in Denmark, whereas immigration has only recently become politically salient
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in Germany. As such, if diversity has an effect in both countries, it is unlikely that
this effect is the result of the presence or absence of anti-immigrant political movements.
Second, the post-war history of Non-Western immigration in Germany and Denmark is
quite different. Prior to the influx of asylum seekers in 2015, Germany’s Non-Western
immigrant population was largely comprised of guest workers and their descendants. In
contrast, a large share of the Non-Western immigrant community in Denmark is made up
of refugees arriving after 1980. Since both refugees and economic migrants continue to ar-
rive in Europe and North America, knowing that the effect of diversity is not restricted to
a specific type of immigrant helps improve its usefulness as an explanation of integration.
Finally, Germany’s unique post-war history offers an additional advantage: by separately
analyzing East and West Germany, I can investigate the robustness of diversity’s effects
to different economic contexts.
3.5.1 Data and Measures
Data for the analyses comes from government statistical agencies– the Federal Statistical
Office in Germany and Statistics Denmark for Denmark. In Germany, I extract a sample
of 467 districts (Kreise), covering all years from 2001 to 2014. Districts are the third
level of government in Germany, below the federal government and the 16 state (Land)
governments. In Denmark, I extract a sample of 276 municipalities, covering the period
from 1981 through 2006.1 During this period, municipalities were also the third level
of government in Denmark, below the national government and the 14 counties. For
both countries, I construct my measures using employment, population, and geographic
records. Appendix B.1 shows the specific administrative tables used to construct each
measure.
Immigrant Unemployment is the main measure of integration in this analysis. Unem-
ployment is an important measure of integration for several reasons. First, unemployment
1The sample ends at this point because in 2007 the municipalities in Denmark were reorganized into 98
larger units and the 14 counties were replaced with 5 regions. All administrative records have a break
at this point and the new municipalities do not perfectly overlap with the old municipalities.
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prevents socioeconomic advancement, leading to marginalization (Dancygier and Laitin
2014). Second, immigrants who are unable to provide for themselves because of unemploy-
ment are more likely to depend on welfare programs, fueling resentment among natives
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) which can further stall integration. Third, employment
can lead to greater perceptions of successful integration and belonging in society (Maxwell
2017). In Germany, I measure Immigrant Unemployment as the number of unemployed
immigrants divided by the total number of immigrants in a district. While unemployment
rates are typically measured among only the labor force, the size of the immigrant labor
force at the district level is unavailable. Consequently, the actual unemployment rate
is higher than what I measure, assuming that the total immigrant population is larger
than the immigrant labor force. I measure Immigrant Unemployment in Denmark as the
number of unemployment immigrants divided by the size of the immigrant labor force in
a municipality. Both variables are measured on 0 to 100 scales.
Measuring immigrant diversity is more complicated. First, the characteristic along
which diversity is measured must be selected. As described in the theory section, diver-
sity along several different attributes has the potential to reduce negative stereotyping
and discrimination. In this analysis, I focus on origin-country diversity. Immigrants’
origin-countries are a relevant trait because origin often impacts many other traits which
matter for distinguishing immigrants from one another, such as names, language, eth-
nicity, race, culture, cuisine, traditions, and religion. Further, national origin is a trait
salient to natives: immigrant neighborhoods are labeled by country (e.g. “Little Italy”
and “Koreatown”) and country of origin is often one of the first questions natives ask
of immigrants and their descendants. Given this, national origin is a trait we would ex-
pect natives to use when forming attitudes toward immigrants. Finally, an advantage of
origin-country over other traits such as ethnicity and religion is that the origin-countries
of immigrants can be easily and accurately measured using government records.
Conceptually, measuring immigrant diversity requires constructing a measure that
captures two features of an immigrant population. First is the number of groups repre-
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sented in an immigrant population. The more groups there are, the higher immigrant
diversity is. Second is the relative size of each group. The more equally sized the groups
are, the higher the level of diversity. An effective measure of immigrant diversity therefore
must simultaneously count the number of groups and their relative sizes. My measure of
immigrant origin-country diversity, Effective Number of Immigrant Communities (ENIC),
is designed to meet this goal. Based on Laasko and Taagepera’s (1979) “Effective Number
of Parties” measure, it is calculated according to the formula
ENIC =
1∑
c2i
where the ci are the share of the total immigrant population from each origin-country.
Crucially, this formula responds to both the number of groups and the relative size of
each group. The more groups there are, the higher ENIC will be, all else equal. However,
the less equally sized these groups are, the lower ENIC will be. This is intuitive given the
above definition of diversity as maximized when, holding the number of groups constant,
all groups are of equal size. The contribution of any single group to ENIC may be positive
or negative: a group that makes up a large share of the population decreases diversity and
hence, ENIC. A group that is relatively equally sized to other groups increases diversity
(and ENIC ). For example, ENIC is 1 when all immigrants in a population hail from
a single country. If another group with the same number of immigrants were added to
the population, the new ENIC value would be 2. Adding a third group that is equal
to the population of the first two groups combined would decrease ENIC. In contrast,
adding a third group that is smaller than the two original groups would increase ENIC,
but by less than 1. In Germany, ENIC is constructed based on administrative records
of the citizenship of immigrant populations at the district level. In Denmark, ENIC is
constructed using records of the origin country of immigrant populations at the municipal
level.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 map immigrant diversity, using ENIC, across the subnational units
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of Germany in 2014 and Denmark in 2000. Both maps show substantial variation across
locales in immigrant diversity. At the high end, there are locales in both countries with
more than 30 effective immigrant communities, and similarly, both countries also contain
locales with fewer than 10 effective communities. In Germany, we see that immigrant di-
versity tends to be higher in East Germany, save for districts bordering Poland. The lowest
levels of diversity are concentrated in the west, especially in the state of North Rhine-
Westphalia, which was the destination for a large share of the guest workers who arrived
in the 1960s. Turning to Denmark, we see that diversity is highest in the east, where the
capital and primary immigrant destination of Copenhagen is located. In contrast, the
lowest levels of immigrant diversity can be found in the municipalities in the southwest of
the country, especially those near the southern border with Germany. However, variation
exists across the country, with higher levels of diversity also seen in municipalities on the
main peninsula of Jutland.
To account for alternative explanations and potential confounders, I include several
control variables in the analysis. Population (number of residents) and Population Density
(number of residents per square kilometer) account for the possibility that more popu-
lous and denser areas are more attractive destinations for immigrants from a wide variety
of origins. This is due to the density of services, availability of low-cost housing, and
strong employment opportunities in these localities. Immigrant Proportion (number of
immigrants divided by the total population) accounts for the size of the overall immigrant
population, which can impact immigrant labor market success both by increasing com-
petition among immigrants but also by provoking higher threat among natives. All three
of these variables are log transformed in the regressions below to account for skewed dis-
tributions and potential non-linearity in their effects on immigrant economic integration.
The Unemployment rate among all residents is also included in the model. This variable
accounts for the overall economic situation in a district/municipality, and is important
to control for as it can impact both immigrants’ migration decisions and their likelihood
of finding employment. As with Immigrant Unemployment, this variable is measured as
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Figure 3.1: Immigrant Diversity in Germany, 2014
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ENIC
Note: ENIC is calculated using data on immigrant populations from the Federal Statistical Office.
the percentage of unemployed individuals in the total population in Germany and as the
number of unemployed individuals in the labor force in Denmark.
I control for two other characteristics of local immigrant populations: Muslim Share
(proportion of total immigrants from majority Muslim countries) and Western Share
(proportion of total immigrants from Western countries). Given well documented Islam-
ophobia among Europeans (e.g. Dancygier and Laitin 2014; Hainmueller and Hangartner
2013) and the difficulty Muslims have had integrating (Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2016),
accounting for Muslim population size allows me to rule out the possibility that the
positive effects of diversity are merely the consequence of small Muslim communities in
diverse locales. Similarly, immigrants from other Western countries are not only highly
skilled and highly educated, but also more culturally similar to Germans and Danes than
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Figure 3.2: Immigrant Diversity in Denmark, 2000
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Note: ENIC is calculated using data on immigrant populations from Statistics Denmark. The five
municipalities comprising the island of Bornholm are omitted to save space.
Non-Western immigrants. As such, we would expect Western immigrants to face less
discrimination and also to be more successful in integration. Accounting for the share
of these immigrants in a district/municipality allows me to rule out the possibility that
diversity’s positive effects are due to concentrations of Western immigrants who increase
diversity but would integrate well in any context.
Finally, I include two controls specific to Germany. Urban District is a dummy variable
indicating that a district is classified as urban (Kreisfreie Stadt) as opposed to rural
(Landkries). These classifications have some impact on the administrative responsibilities
and structure of the local governments, which has the potential to impact immigrant
economic integration. Finally, East Germany is an indicator for districts in the five states
that were part of the former German Democratic Republic. East Germany’s economy
is less well developed than the West’s, and the immigrant populations in East Germany
are both newer and smaller than their West German counterparts. The East’s history
therefore has the potential to impact the structure of the immigrant population as well as
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their economic integration. Summary statistics for both the German and Danish datasets
are available in Appendix B.1.
3.6 Results
Does immigrant diversity improve integration? To answer this question, I fit a series
of multilevel linear models to both the German and Danish datasets using the variables
described above. To account for unmeasured differences across localities, I include random
intercepts for districts and states in the model for Germany and random intercepts for
municipalities and counties in Denmark. Similarly, I account for unmeasured temporal
differences by including random intercepts for year in all models. My modeling strategy
means that the estimated effect of ENIC combines within-unit and over-time effects. This
is in line with the theoretical argument, which expects diversity’s positive impacts to be
felt both within and across locales. Starting with Germany, I present the results for each
country separately below. After presenting the main results, I investigate whether reverse
causality explains my results using the case of the Øresund Bridge.
3.6.1 Germany
I fit three models of integration with the German dataset: a model of the full German
sample, a model including only the 11 states of the former West Germany, and a model
including only the 5 states of the former East Germany. Fitting a model to the full
dataset is useful as it gives an estimate of the overall effect of diversity across Germany.
Fitting models to the two subsamples helps probe the generalizability of the estimates
from the full sample. Specifically, the variation between East and West Germany in
terms of unemployment and immigrant population composition creates two quite different
contexts in which integration proceeds. Economically, the West is much stronger: the
average unemployment rate in for districts in the East is 7.97, while it is only 3.55 in the
West. In contrast, immigrant populations in East Germany are both smaller and more
diverse: on average, a district in East Germany has a population made up of only 1.8%
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Figure 3.3: Estimated Effects of ENIC on Immigrant Unemployment in Germany
Estimated Effect of ENIC
East Germany
West Germany
Full Sample
−0.15 −0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05
Note: Points represent estimates from multilevel linear models with 95% confidence intervals. Each point
represents the estimate of ENIC from a different model with y-axis labels indicating the regions included
in the model.
immigrants from 19 effective immigrant communities while a district in West Germany
has a population made up of 8.2% immigrants from 12 effective immigrant communities.
Political attitudes toward immigrants are also quite different in the two regions: the right-
wing party Alternative for Germany’s average vote share in state elections in the Eastern
states is 15.5%, while it is only 8.6% in Western states.
Figure 3.3 presents the main quantity of interest from these models: the estimated
effect of ENIC on Immigrant Unemployment. The solid circles in Figure 3.3 are the point
estimates for ENIC, while bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Full regression tables,
including estimates for the control variables, are available in Appendix B.2.
My main finding is that integration is more successful in districts with higher immi-
grant diversity, as measured by ENIC. For all three samples, the estimated effect of ENIC
is both negative and significant. To contextualize the estimated effect for the full sample,
-0.05, the predicted difference in Immigrant Unemployment between a high (1 standard
deviation above the mean) diversity district and low (1 standard deviation below the
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mean) diversity district is -0.64. In other words, Immigrant Unemployment is predicted
to be more than a half point lower in high diversity districts. At the average level of
Immigrant Unemployment in the German data set, 7.56, an effect of this size would rep-
resents a decrease of approximately 8.4%. That this effect is present despite the inclusion
of a large battery of controls accounting for confounders and alternative explanations,
such as the overall unemployment rate, the share of Westerners and Muslims among local
immigrant populations, and the size of the immigrant population, suggests that the effect
of immigrant diversity is not easily explained away and further supports the theoretical
argument.
Turning to the models for East and West Germany, Figure 3.3 shows that ENIC has
a significant effect in both regions, and that the effect is approximately twice as strong in
East Germany. Using the same predicted difference in Immigrant Unemployment between
high and low diversity districts as above, the East German model predicts an Immigrant
Unemployment difference of -1.08 percentage points and the West German model an
Immigrant Unemployment difference of -0.53 percentage points. These results show that
diversity and integration are associated in both a wealthy, relatively cosmopolitan region
with many immigrants (West Germany) and in a poorer, less cosmopolitan region with
fewer immigrants (East Germany). The larger effect size in East Germany further suggests
that immigrant diversity’s positive effects may be greater in areas where there are more
obstacles to integration.
3.6.2 Denmark
Similar to the analysis of the effects of immigrant diversity in Germany, I fit three mul-
tilevel linear models to the Danish data. The first model uses all of the available data
to estimate the effect of diversity for all immigrants across the entire country. The other
two models using the Danish data estimate the effect of diversity separately for West-
ern and Non-Western immigrants. This is possible because Statistics Denmark publishes
unemployment rates at the municipal level not only for all immigrants, but also for two
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subgroups of immigrants: immigrants from Western and immigrants from Non-Western
countries.2 To implement these subgroup analyses, I create six new variables. First,
Western Immigrant Unemployment and Non-Western Immigrant Unemployment serve
as the outcome variables for these analyses, each calculated in the same manner as Immi-
grant Unemployment but by including only Western or Non-Western immigrants in lieu
of all immigrants. Second, I create measures of diversity for the separate origin-country
categories: ENIC – Western and ENIC – Non-Western. Finally, I replace Immigrant
Proportion with Western Immigrant Proportion and Non-Western Immigrant Propor-
tion, which are calculated as the proportion of Western and Non-Western immigrants in
the total population.
Figure 3.4 presents the key quantity of interest from the three Danish models: the
estimated effect of ENIC on Immigrant Unemployment (both measures are calculated
among all, Western, or Non-Western immigrants, depending on the model). Points on
Figure 3.4 represent the estimated effect, and the bars represent 95% confidence inter-
vals. The corresponding regression tables, including estimates for control variables, are
in Appendix B.2.
My findings in Denmark further conform to the main empirical implication of the-
oretical argument, namely that immigrant diversity leads to successful integration. In
the model using all immigrants, regardless of origin, the estimated effect of ENIC, -0.06,
is both significant and negative. Returning to the same comparison of high and low
diversity locales as used in the section on Germany, this effect size for ENIC implies
an Immigrant Unemployment difference of 0.57 percentage points between high and low
diversity municipalities.
Figure 3.4 also shows a wide disparity in the effect of ENIC between Western and Non-
Western immigrants. For Western immigrants, there is no relationship between ENIC and
their unemployment rates. The estimated effect for Western immigrants is slightly less
2I use Statistics Denmark’s classification of countries as Western or Non-Western in my analysis; see
Appendix B.1 for the specific set of countries included in each category.
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Figure 3.4: Estimated Effects of ENIC on Immigrant Unemployment in Denmark
Estimated Effect of ENIC
Non−Western
Immigrants
Western
Immigrants
All Immigrants
−0.6 −0.5 −0.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0
Note: Points represent estimates from multilevel linear models with 95% confidence intervals. Each point
represents the estimate of ENIC from a different model, with y-axis labels indicating the immigrant
groups used to calculate ENIC and Immigrant Unemployment in the model.
than for all immigrants, but the standard errors mean it is not statistically distinguishable
from an effect of zero. In contrast, the effect of ENIC for Non-Western immigrants is
very large and statistically significant. Compared to the effect of ENIC among all immi-
grants (-0.06), the estimate for just Non-Western immigrants (-0.47) is almost seven times
larger. In substantive terms, this effect size indicates that the difference in Non-Western
Immigrant Unemployment between a high diversity and low diversity municipality would
be 3.43 percentage points. Compared to the average unemployment rate for Non-Western
immigrants of 18.32, a decrease of 3.43 percentage points would represent a 20% decrease.
The positive effects of diversity appear to be almost entirely driven by diversity among
Non-Western immigrants. Combined with the results in Germany, the analysis suggests
that not only is diversity more beneficial in places where integration is more difficult, but
also that diversity is more beneficial to immigrants who otherwise face the most challenges
to integration.
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3.7 Testing for Reverse Causality: the Case of the
Øresund Bridge
While the above results show an association between integration and diversity, they do
not establish a causal relationship running from diversity to integration. It may instead
be the case that causality occurs in the other direction: successful economic integration
may motivate immigrants from a diverse set of countries to migrate, increasing immigrant
diversity. Using the case of the Øresund Bridge, which was opened in 2000 and connects
the cities of Copenhagen, Denmark and Malmo¨, Sweden, I am able to test this alternative
explanation. The opening of the bridge made commuting between Denmark and Sweden
much easier, and consequently expanded the markets for companies operating in the
Copenhagen area, increasing the pool of potential jobs available to populations on both
sides of the bridge. This increase in economic opportunity occurred without any changes to
other factors which may have made the Copenhagen area a more desirable destination for
immigrants: natives’ attitudes did not change, the housing stock in Copenhagen did not
change, Copenhagen’s schools were not improved, nor did its municipal policies change. If
increased economic opportunity is indeed a driver of immigrant diversity, then the opening
of the Øresund Bridge should have caused diversity to increase in the Copenhagen area.
To test this hypothesis, I first assess whether immigrant employment increased in the
Copenhagen area following the opening of the bridge, and then test whether immigrant
diversity also increased in the years following the bridge’s opening. Specifically, I con-
sider exposure to the Øresund Bridge as a treatment that impacted municipalities in the
Copenhagen area in the years after 2000. I estimate the effect of this treatment using
a difference-in-differences design. This design compares the change in Immigrant Unem-
ployment before and after the bridge’s opening in the Copenhagen area to the change
in Immigrant Unemployment in rest of Denmark. The left panel of Figure 3.5 plots this
difference-in-differences relationship graphically, with points representing the average im-
migrant unemployment rate in the Copenhagen area and the rest of Denmark in the two
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Figure 3.5: The Effect of the Øresund Bridge on Economic Integration and Diversity
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Note: Points represent group averages with 95% confidence bars around them. The before period includes
1998 and 1999, and the after period includes 2001 and 2002.
years before and two years after the bridge’s opening. Based on the parallel trends as-
sumption, if there were no effect we would expect the slope of the lines connecting the
averages to be the same for both regions. This is not what the plot shows. Instead, the
immigrant unemployment rate dropped much more in the Copenhagen area than it did
in the rest of the country. As regression analyses available in the Appendix B.3 indicate,
this difference is statistically significant and is substantively meaningful: immigrant un-
employment was 1.8 percentage points lower after the bridge’s opening than would be
expected in the absence of the bridge.
Having established that the opening of the bridge improved immigrant’s economic in-
tegration in comparison to what we would have expected, I now turn to assessing whether
immigrant diversity increased in the same period. Based on the reverse causation argu-
ment, if immigrant diversity is a consequence of integration, then we would expect to see
diversity increase in the Copenhagen area relative to the rest of Denmark in the years
after the bridge’s opening. The right panel of Figure 3.5 tests this expectation, comparing
the temporal change in ENIC between the Copenhagen area and the rest of Denmark.
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Figure 3.5 shows that ENIC increased in both areas over the time period, but does not
show any evidence that diversity increased at a higher rate in the Copenhagen area in
comparison to the rest of Denmark; in fact, regression analysis in Appendix B.3 shows
that the two slopes are statistically indistinguishable. That there is no evidence of an
increase in diversity after the bridge’s opening indicates that the relationship between
immigrant diversity and economic integration shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 is not due to
reverse causation.
3.8 Mechanism Analysis: Immigrant Diversity and
Natives’ Attitudes
Having established an empirical link between immigrant diversity and integration and
ruling out reverse causality as an explanation of this link, I now turn to a test of the main
casual mechanism linking diversity and integration in my theory: immigrant diversity’s
impact on natives’ attitudes. Specifically, I argue that increasing levels of immigrant
diversity prevent the development and use of negative stereotypes, thereby reducing anti-
immigrant attitudes. To test this mechanism, I developed and implemented an original
conjoint survey which allows me to estimate the causal effect of immigrant diversity on
attitudes toward immigrants.3
3.8.1 Experimental Design
Conjoint experiments allow researchers to elicit respondents’ preferences over the indi-
vidual dimensions of a multidimensional phenomenon by repeatedly asking respondents
which of multiple examples of the phenomenon they prefer. They have been success-
fully used in political science research (e.g. Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Hansen, Olsen and
Bech 2015), especially in the study of immigration attitudes (e.g. Hainmueller and Hop-
kins 2015; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2016). In the current context, each choice
task presents respondents a pair immigrant groups and asks them which group they would
3This experimental design was preregistered on egap.org, study ID 20161110AD. The experimental anal-
ysis presented in this section follows the procedures set out in the pre-analysis plan.
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prefer to be settled in their community. Respondents complete four choice tasks.
Nine attributes, or pieces of information, about the immigrant groups are presented
to respondents in the group profiles. The first seven attributes describe the group’s
composition by origin country, and together are used to randomize levels of immigrant
diversity. First, Group Size is fixed at 60 for all groups, ensuring that preferences over
groups are not influenced by respondent’s preferences on the number of immigrants to
settle. The next six attributes describe the number of immigrants in the group from each
of six countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Eritrea, Nigeria, Serbia, and Syria. These six
countries were chosen to maximize the realism of the groups: each of these six countries
had at least 5,000 asylum applicants in Germany in 2015 (Bundesamt fu¨r Migration und
Flu¨chtlinge 2015). They also offer balance between regions, as there are two countries
each from Europe, Asia, and Africa. The order in which the countries are presented is
randomized across respondents but is constant for each respondent across the four choice
tasks.
Allocation of the 60 immigrants to the 6 origin-countries is determined by the Diversity
treatment, which is randomly selected between Low, Medium, or High for each profile.
Each level of Diversity is a vector of six non-negative integers that sum to 60; these six
values represent the number of immigrants from each the six origin-countries. Table 3.1
shows how each of these three treatments divides 60 into six parts. The Low diversity
treatment assigns all 60 immigrants a single country. In the Medium diversity treatment,
three of the six countries are represented in the group, although one country clearly makes
up a larger share of the group than the other two. The High diversity treatment maximizes
diversity, as all countries are represented in the group in equal size. After a group has
been assigned a level of Diversity, the order of the six numbers in the diversity vector
are randomized before being assigned to the origin-countries. This randomization ensures
that diversity and the number of immigrants in any given origin-country are independent.
Education and Young Men are the two remaining attributes included in the immigrant
profiles. Their inclusion increases the realism of the groups and ensures that any estimated
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Table 3.1: Three Diversity Scenarios
Low Medium High
Country 1 60 30 10
Country 2 0 20 10
Country 3 0 10 10
Country 4 0 0 10
Country 5 0 0 10
Country 6 0 0 10
Total 60 60 60
Note: Cells represent numbers of immigrants.
effects of Diversity cannot be explained by a lack of other relevant information. Education
describes the share of the group with a university education. This is randomly selected
from 0%, 10%, 20% and 30%. These levels also reflect reality: estimates suggest that
about 20% of the recent asylum seekers entering Germany attended university (Rich
2016).4 Young Men, which is the share of men under age 25 in the group, is randomly
selected from 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%. These values also represent reality: the
German Federal Office of Migration and Refugees reports that approximately 38% of
asylum seekers entering Germany in 2015 were young men (Bundesamt fu¨r Migration
und Flu¨chtlinge 2015). Together, these two attributes provide substantial and relevant
information for respondents to use when evaluating immigrant groups. Not only are the
levels of these attributes reflective of the current trend in migration in Germany, but levels
of education, age and gender are known to be significant predictors of attitudes towards
immigrants (Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015).
Table 3.2 presents an example pair of immigrant groups. Among the attributes, infor-
mation about origin-countries was always presented first, with the number of immigrants
per origin-country shown above the total group size. Education or Young Men were
shown below the origin information; the order of these two traits is randomized across
respondents and then held constant across the choice tasks.
4Unfortunately, estimates of how many of these 20% had finished their studies are unavailable. However,
assuming that half of those attending received a degree, it is plausible that a group of 60 immigrants
could contain 20 individuals with a degree.
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Table 3.2: Example Immigrant Groups
Group A Group B
Number of immigrants per country:
Syria 0 30
Afghanistan 0 20
Albania 60 0
Eritrea 0 10
Nigeria 0 0
Serbia 0 0
Total 60 60
Group Traits:
Share with university education 0% 20%
Share of male immigrants under age 25 25% 50%
After viewing the two immigrant group profiles, respondents were asked which of the
two groups they would prefer to have settled in their community. Responses to this
question form the outcome variable Settlement Preference: an indicator variable taking
on the value of 1 for the selected group and 0 for the other group. Because this question
requires respondents to select one of two groups, it separates attitudes toward groups
from attitudes towards immigration overall. Other studies (e.g. Hainmueller and Hopkins
2015) have used a similar question to successfully measure attitudes toward immigrants.
3.8.2 Experimental Results
The experiment was administered to a sample of 2,130 adult, voting-eligible German re-
spondents between December 23 and December 30, 2016.5 Immigrant groups are the unit
of analysis, and the key quantity of interest is the effect of Diversity on Settlement Prefer-
ence. More specifically, I am interested in the effect of a diversity level on the probability
that a group is preferred for settlement. I use a weighted OLS regression to estimate this
quantity, where the weights adjust for differences between the sample and German pop-
5The sample was provided by Respondi; programming and hosting of the survey was done on Qualtrics.
Details about the sampling process, survey implementation, and descriptive statistics are available in
Appendix B.4.
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Figure 3.6: Effects of Group Diversity on Probability of Being Preferred for Settlement
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Note: Points represent the effect of diversity levels on the change in probability of being preferred for
settlement in comparison to the baseline category, medium. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals
around OLS estimates with standard errors clustered by respondent.
ulation on age, state, gender, and education.6 Diversity enters the regression as a pair of
dummy variables, one for High and one for Low, leaving Medium as the baseline category.
I also include coefficients in the regression for Education and Young Men. Standard errors
are clustered by respondent to account for autocorrelation generated by the forced choice
outcome variable (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). Figure 3.6 presents the
estimated effects of Diversity ; the corresponding regression table, including estimates of
the effects of Education and Young Men, can be found in Appendix B.5.
Figure 3.6 reveals a significant and positive effect of high immigrant diversity on
natives’ attitudes, in accord with the empirical implication of the theoretical argument.
The coefficients can be interpreted as the change in a group’s probability of being preferred
for settlement caused by a change in Diversity from medium to high or low. According to
this interpretation, the estimate of 0.044 for high diversity indicates that high diversity
groups were selected at a rate 4.4 percentage points higher than medium diversity groups.
This effect is statistically distinguishable from both zero and the estimated effect of low
6As I show in Appendix B.5, my results are robust to using the unweighted data.
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diversity, showing that when given the choice, respondents prefer that high diversity
immigrant groups are settled their community over low and medium diversity groups.
In contrast, the estimate for low diversity is very close to zero and is not statistically
distinguishable from zero. Respondents did not differentiate between the low and medium
diversity levels when selecting groups for settlement.
Calculating the ENIC values for the three levels of diversity helps contextualize the
results. In the low diversity condition, ENIC is 1: all immigrants are from a single
country. In the medium diversity condition, ENIC rises slightly, to 2.57. Finally, ENIC
in the high diversity condition is 6. That there is no significant difference between the
low and medium diversity groups, an ENIC gap of 1.57, suggests that small differences
in diversity do not trigger attitude changes. In contrast, the ENIC gaps between high
and low as well as high and medium are 5 and 3.43, respectively. At these higher levels
of ENIC difference, diversity does cause attitudes do change. This implies that while
slight changes in diversity may be too subtle to alter natives’ attitudes, more substantial
changes are indeed noticed by natives and do prompt a change in attitudes.
3.9 Conclusion
Though immigrant populations vary substantially across localities, the consequences of
these variations for successful integration are not well known. I contribute by developing
an argument that connects immigrant diversity to successful integration. Specifically, I
argue that immigrant diversity leads to more successful integration because diverse im-
migrant groups are less likely to provoke negative stereotyping, anti-immigrant attitudes,
and discrimination.
Analyzing data from over 700 localities in Germany and Denmark covering more than
30 years, I find that immigrant unemployment is substantially lower when immigrants
are more diverse. The findings are equally strong in Denmark, West Germany, and East
Germany, indicating that the positive effect of diversity is not extremely contingent upon
a particular economic context, immigration policy regime, or political context. Further
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evidence leveraging the construction of the Øresund Bridge in Denmark shows that re-
verse causality is unlikely to be responsible for my findings. I also conducted an original
survey experiment to test the impact of diversity on attitudes toward immigrants. The
survey results show a causal effect of diversity on natives’ attitudes, with high diversity
groups being preferred over low diversity groups. Considering all of this evidence together,
I conclude that immigrant diversity plays an important role in integration and the forma-
tion of natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. More broadly, my findings show that the
demographics of immigrant populations need to be considered alongside other contextual
variables in order to fully understand immigrant integration.
A nuance of my findings is that the effect of diversity is much stronger for Non-Western
immigrants than for Western immigrants. Given that Non-Western immigrants are often
the main target of anti-immigrant attitudes and discrimination (Dancygier and Laitin
2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), they are the immigrants for whom integration is
often most challenging. Consequently, understanding how to improve integration for this
group is especially crucial. My findings show that immigrant diversity is one pathway for
improving this group’s integration, and that diversity has this effect by reducing natives’
opposition to these groups. While I have tested the impact of diversity on employment,
the overall benefits of immigrant diversity likely extend beyond employment. Natives’ at-
titudes matter for other fields of integration (e.g. political representation and citizenship),
and it is likely that immigrant diversity has positive impacts in these areas as well.
For policy makers interested in both the successful integration of immigrants and
minimizing native backlash, these findings are highly relevant. Many European countries
implement spatial dispersion programs, in which newly arrived refugees are assigned to
reside in a locale by the central government. Typically, these programs aim to distribute
refugees evenly among regions of the country. My results suggest designing spatial dis-
persion policies to maximize immigrant diversity could produce long-term benefits in the
form of successful integration. However, trade-offs in the form of initial difficulties that
would arise for refugees assigned to locations where few of their co-ethnics reside would
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also need to be considered. These results have similar implications for how policymak-
ers allocate entry visas: quotas encouraging immigration from a wide variety of sending
countries are likely to lead to less native backlash and more successful integration than
policies targeting immigrants from a small group of countries.
Finally, this study has not examined the universe of immigrant diversity’s potential
impacts on integration or natives’ attitudes. My argument prioritizes the impact of im-
migrant diversity on natives’ perceptions and attitudes toward immigrants. Immigrant
diversity also has the potential to impact immigrants’ behaviors directly. For example,
high immigrant diversity may limit the size of immigrants’ social networks, prevent the
formation of ethnic enclaves, and impede collective action among all immigrants in a
locale. The impacts of these behavioral consequences of diversity on integration may
be both positive and negative. Fewer enclaves may improve immigrant-native relations,
while higher costs of collective action may prevent immigrants from getting politicians to
respond to their concerns. Investigating these behavioral consequences of diversity is an
important task for future research.
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Chapter 4
Welcome or Worry: How Do Natives
Receive Young Immigrant Men?
4.1 Introduction
A central topic of the public discourse about the European refugee crisis has been the
large share of young men among the asylum seekers. Media outlets have written numerous
stories depicting these young men as a problem, highlighting their aggressive behavior1
and their need to be taught European gender norms.2 Some stories even have titles as
blunt as “Abnormal number of young men a problem for Sweden.”3 Politicians have been
quick to politicize these young men. Geert Wilders, leader of the anti-immigrant Party
for Freedom in the Netherlands, said “Masses of young men in their twenties ... [are] ...
an invasion that threatens our prosperity, our security, our culture and identity.”4 The
head of the Alternative for Germany in Berlin said there are “ ... increasing problems
with these so-called groups of young men.”5 All of this has led commentators to describe
these young men as the “horror of the west,”6 causing fear among the public.7
1“Extrem fordernd, unzuverla¨ssig und aufdringlich,” Die Welt (2016, January 17).
2“Norway Offers Migrants a Lesson in How to Treat Women,” The New York Times (2015, December
19).
3“Abnorma antalet unga ma¨n ett problem fo¨r Sverige,” Go¨teborgs-Posten (2016, January 19).
4“Wilders tells Dutch parliament refugee crisis is ‘Islamic invasion’,” Reuters (2015, September 10).
5“Berliner AfD-Politiker Fest nennt Zuwanderer ‘Gesindel’,” Der Tagesspiegel (2017, March 29).
6“Ma¨nner, Monster und Muslime,” Der Spiegel (2015, November 2).
7“Flu¨chtlinge und deutsche Frauen: Eine Armla¨nge Unsicherheit,” Der Spiegel (2016, April 19).
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To what extent is this a reflection of the real fears of the European public? Perhaps
these sentiments are an example of the hyperbole common among the media and politi-
cians. It is equally plausible that young male immigrants are actually preferred because
of their economic potential, which has been shown to positively affect natives’ attitudes
toward asylum seekers (Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2016). That is, in demo-
graphically ailing European societies these young men can fulfill labor shortages and are
unlikely to pose as great of a burden on the welfare state as women and older immigrants.
Indeed, Germany’s labor minister has argued that investing in the education of these
young new arrivals is good for Germany.8 In line with this, current scientific evidence on
European attitudes towards asylum seekers finds no widespread opposition to young men:
replicating Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner’s (2016) analysis shows acceptance of
young men is equal to the acceptance of old women and middle-aged men, and greater
than the acceptance received by old men.9
However, other scholarly work on attitudes towards immigrants suggests that we
should see strong public opposition to young immigrant men. First, natives are likely
to see young immigrant men as posing a security threat, fearing they will make communi-
ties less safe. These concerns are known drivers of anti-immigration attitudes (Huysmans
2006; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004), and in-
clude fears of terrorism, sexual assault, theft, and other violence. Second, opposition
to young men may be fueled by the cultural threat they pose. Anxiety about the cul-
tural impact of immigration can extend to many domains, including language (Hopkins
2015), the national identity (Sides and Citrin 2007), and norms and values (Sniderman,
Hagendoorn and Prior 2004). Across these domains, a key finding is that natives who
are more anxious about immigration’s cultural impact are more opposed to immigration
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Young immigrant men, especially those from cultures
where women’s role in society is restricted, are likely to pose such a threat to European
8“Sind die Flu¨chtlinge da, wo die Arbeit ist?,” Handelsblatt (2017, March 14).
9Details of Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016) replication are in Appendix C.1.
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norms of relative gender equality. Further, the possibility of young men seeking family
reunification could lead to cultural threat, as they may set up isolated communities with
little incentive to integrate.
In this paper, I bring new evidence to bear on attitudes towards this group of immi-
grants. First, I test whether natives are more opposed to young immigrant men than they
are to other immigrants. Second, I investigate which of the three competing mechanisms
described above (economic potential, security threat, and cultural threat) best explains
attitudes toward young men. My evidence comes from a conjoint experiment conducted
in Germany on attitudes towards groups of immigrants with randomly varying shares of
young men. To date, very little systematic research has been done on this important
group. Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016) come closest to studying attitudes
toward young men by including both age and gender as attributes on their conjoint exper-
iments. However, their study was not explicitly designed to test attitudes toward young
men, but rather, was designed to study attitudes towards asylum seekers’ economic and
cultural characteristics and their reasons for seeking asylum.
An additional improvement of my study over previous work is my focus on groups
of young immigrant men, as opposed to individuals. While focusing on individuals is
important (see Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015;
Hopkins 2015; Turper et al. 2015), if we want to understand how to best settle immigrants
in communities to maximize native acceptance and thereby foster integration success
(Dancygier and Laitin 2014), we also need to know if natives have a bias against groups
of young men (and why). After all, for logistic and other reasons, settlement is often done
in groups. For example, when a refugee housing center recently opened in Berlin, 300
people were expected to move in over the course of just a few days.10 Similarly, in the
French region of Lorraine, municipalities received refugees in groups of 15, 20, 40, and
60.11 Hence, studying the impact of group attributes has important practical relevance
10“Raus aus der Turnhalle, rein in die MUF,” Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (2017, January 27).
11“Des migrants de Calais en Lorraine,” L’Est Re´publicain (2016, October 24).
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for understanding public responses to the settlement of immigrants.
My findings reveal substantial opposition to groups of young immigrant men among
the German public. I also find evidence that security and cultural threats underpin this
opposition, with security threats being relatively more important. My results show no
evidence that Germans see young men as having high economic potential in comparison
to other immigrants. These results imply that (1) a concentration of young men among
a group of immigrants exacerbates the political challenge of immigration, but (2) policy
measures that prioritize public safety and cultural integration can significantly lessen this
challenge.
4.2 Research Design
To study attitudes toward young immigrant men, I conducted a conjoint experiment in
Germany.12 Two features make Germany an appealing case. First, Germany took in
the largest absolute number of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, and on a per-capita
basis, took in more asylum seekers than every European country save Austria, Sweden,
and Hungary.13 Due to the high salience of the immigration issue, studying Germany
has great practical relevance. Second, the share of young men among recent arrivals in
Germany is very typical of European countries. Specifically, 41% of asylum applicants
in Germany were young men in 2016, which is very close to the 42% median among all
European countries.14 This enhances the generalizability of the inferences drawn from
this study.
In the conjoint experiment, respondents were asked to evaluate groups of immigrants
that could potentially be settled in their community. Each group was comprised of 60
immigrants, randomly varying in terms of origin countries, education, and the share of
young men in the group. Groups were presented and evaluated two at a time, and each
respondent evaluated four pairs of groups.
12The conjoint experiment’s design was pre-registered on EGAP, Study ID: 20161110AD. A copy of this
pre-analysis plan can be found in Appendix D.
13Based on Eurostat tables “demo gind” and “migr asyappctza.”
14Based on Eurostat table “migr asyappctza.” Young here refers to ages 18-34.
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The key attribute is Young Men, which identifies the share – 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or
100% – of the 60 immigrants who are men under the age of 25. Allowing the share of
young men to vary so substantially reflects actual demographics in Germany: as stated
above, approximately 42% of asylum seekers in 2016 were young men. It is therefore
plausible that some communities have received groups of immigrants with overwhelming
majorities of young men.
The other two attributes – countries of origin and education levels – are included to
create groups that respondents will perceive as more realistic. They also ensure that a
lack of relevant information for evaluating the groups does not influence the results. First,
the countries of origin are Afghanistan, Albania, Eritrea, Nigeria, Serbia, and Syria. The
number of immigrants per countries was shown as an attribute, and was randomly selected
as 0, 10, 20, 30, or 60, subject to the constraint that the total number of immigrants is
always 60. These countries were chosen to increase the realism of the immigrant groups:
at least 5,000 asylum seekers from each of these countries entered Germany in 2015 (Bun-
desamt fu¨r Migration und Flu¨chtlinge 2015). Second, Education presented the share of
the immigrants with a university degree, and was randomly selected to be 0%, 10%, 20%
or 30%. These values were also chosen to reflect the reality of asylum seekers in Germany:
estimates suggest that about 20% attended university (Rich 2016).15
For each pair of groups, respondents were first asked “if you had to choose between
them, which of the two groups would you prefer be settled in your community?” Responses
are coded into a binary variable, Settlement Preference, which takes on 1 if a group is
selected and 0 if it is not.16 Because respondents are forced to choose one of the two
groups, this item allows me to separate opposition to young immigrant men from overall
opposition to immigration. This variable serves as the outcome in the main analysis
below. More information on the conjoint design and an example of the groups shown to
15Unfortunately, estimates of how many of these 20% had finished their studies are unavailable. Never-
theless, if we assume that half of those attending received their degree, it is plausible that a group of
60 could contain 20 individuals with a degree.
16A similar question has been used in other prominent studies of immigration attitudes (e.g. Bansak,
Hainmueller and Hangartner 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015).
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respondents is in Appendix C.2.
Three additional questions were asked about each group. These items are designed
to test the three mechanisms proposed for explaining support or opposition to young
immigrant men: Economic Potential, Security Threat, and Cultural Threat. Each item
asked respondents to indicate their agreement (on a 7 point scale from “strongly disagree”
to “strongly agree”) with a statement about the group. For Economic Potential, the
statement was “Few members of Group X will find jobs in my community.” For Security
Threat, the statement was “Group X would be a safety concern for my community.”
Finally, the statement for Cultural Threat was “Group X would adapt well to German
culture.” Following Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016), each of these scales is
recoded into a binary variable. For Economic Potential and Cultural Threat any of the
“disagree” responses, which represent perceptions of high Economic Potential or Cultural
Threat, are coded as 1. Similarly, the “agree” responses for Security Threat are coded as
1.
4.3 Results
The experiment was administered to a sample of 2,130 Germans in December 2016.
Groups of immigrants serve as the unit of analysis, and the quantity of interest from
the experiment is the effect of Young Men on Settlement Preference. This quantity is in-
terpreted as the change in probability of being preferred for settlement caused by a change
in the share of young men. These effects are estimated by weighted least squares regres-
sion, where the group attributes Young Men and Education enter as a series of dummy
variables. Standard errors are clustered by respondent to account for autocorrelation
induced by the forced choice outcome (see Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014).
Figure 4.1 presents the estimated effects of Young Men, the corresponding regression table
is available in Appendix C.3.
The estimates indicate strong opposition to groups of immigrants with many young
men. They can be interpreted as the difference in selection probability between a group
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Figure 4.1: The Effect of Young Men on Preferences over Immigrant Groups
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and the baseline, a group with no young men. Therefore, the coefficient of 0.025 for the
25% young men groups indicates these groups are selected at a rate 2.5 percentage points
lower than the group with no young men. This effect is not distinguishable from zero, and
suggests that groups with a small number of young men are viewed relatively similarly as
groups with no young men. In contrast, the effects for groups with more than 50% young
men are all significant and substantively meaningful. When young men make up exactly
half of a group, the penalty is 8.6 percentage points. The effects are even larger for the
groups with majority young men: when being selected for settlement, groups with 75%
and 100% young men suffer penalties of 18 and 28 percentage points to their probabilities
of being preferred.
Data on the actual demographics of asylum seekers in Germany helps put these es-
timates in context. Because the actual share of young men among asylum seekers in
Germany was approximately 42%, groups from the survey with 0% and 25% young men
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represent below average numbers of young men, while the other three levels of young men
are above average. Pooling groups into these two categories, and then averaging over the
four levels of Education, the predicted selection probabilities for the groups with fewer
than average young men is 0.6, while it is only 0.46 for the groups with more than average
young men. These results suggest that deviations from the average number of young men
which occur in the settlement of asylum seekers can make the difference between public
support and public opposition.
Additional analyses reported in Appendix C.3 show that these attitudes are held
consistently over subgroups of respondents. Specifically, the results are not meaningfully
different for: (1) male and female respondents, (2) young and old respondents, (3) high
and low education respondents, and (4) East and West German respondents. Among the
respondents to this survey, there is a broad consensus in opposition to young men. Further,
the results of a pilot study conducted among a sample of Mechanical Turk respondents in
the United States show similar opposition to groups of young men.17 This indicates that
anti-young immigrant men attitudes are not specific to Germany.
4.4 What Explains These Attitudes?
Having established that a large share of young men in a group of immigrants provokes
native opposition, I now turn to exploring three proposed explanations for these attitudes:
Economic Potential, Security Threat, and Cultural Threat. To do this, I fit a weighted
OLS regression for each of these scales. As above, these models have standard errors
clustered by respondent and Young Men and Education each enter the regression as a
series of dummy variables. Figure 4.2 presents the estimated effects for Young Men; the
corresponding regression table can be found in Appendix C.3.
First, I investigated whether respondents perceived young immigrant men as more
likely to find jobs, thereby contributing to the German economy. Given that young men
are in their prime earning years and are very likely to enter the work force, it is reasonable
17Pilot study details and results reported in Appendix C.4.
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Figure 4.2: The Effect of Young Men on Group Evaluations
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to expect respondents to see them as likely to find work. The results in the first panel
of Figure 4.2 show that this is not the case. Instead, none of the estimated effects of
Young Men on Economic Potential are significantly different from zero, and most of the
estimates are close to zero. Hence, respondents are not any more optimistic about young
men’s ability to find jobs than other immigrants’ ability.
The second panel of Figure 4.2 analyzes whether young men are provoking a higher
Security Threat than other immigrants. Perceptions of high security threat are can orig-
inate from stereotyping of young men as terrorists and criminals based on their role in
high-profile terrorist attacks and criminal activities. The estimates in Figure 4.2 bear this
out. As the share of immigrants in a group who are young men increases, the probability
of a group being rated as a high security threat rises. While groups with only 25% young
men are not significantly more likely to be rated as high security threat group than the
0% group, any group with more than 50% young men is. The effect sizes are substantively
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meaningful: groups containing 50%, 75%, and 100% young men are 5, 9, and 12 percent-
age points, respectively, more likely to be rated as a security threat than the baseline. As
the baseline rate is about 36%, this indicates that approximately half of all 100% young
men groups were rated as a high security threat.
Finally, the third panel of Figure 4.2 tests whether young men also increase perceptions
of Cultural Threat. This type of threat could be rooted in fears that the young men will
violate European values, especially regarding the treatment of women, and that the young
men will apply for family reunification, disincentivizing integration. The estimates offer
support for the claim that young immigrant men provoke a significant cultural threat. As
the share of young men in a group increases, so does the probability that a group is viewed
as unlikely to culturally integrate. For all groups save the 25% group, the estimated effect
is significantly different from the baseline. However, the effect sizes are relatively smaller
than those for Security Threat : only 4 percentage points for groups with 50% or 75%
young men, and 8 percentage points for the group composed entirely of young men.
Altogether, this evidence points toward perceptions of security threats and skepticism
about their potential to adapt to German cultural norms as underpinning opposition to
young immigrant men. Among these two threats, it appears that concerns about security
dominate: for the 75% and 100% levels of Young Men, the estimated effect sizes on
Security Threat are roughly four percentage points large than the corresponding effect
sizes on Cultural Threat. However, for both types of threats it appears that only large
concentrations of young men lead to increased perceptions of threat: the estimated effect
of 25% young men is significant for neither threat type.
4.5 Conclusion
Given the large number of young men who entered Europe among the asylum seekers in
2015 and 2016, these findings suggest that the finding public support for the settlement
of asylum seekers may be more challenging for European governments than originally
thought. How can this challenge be reduced? One option is to tailor refugee dispersion
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quotas which prevent the concentration of young men within a locality. Another avenue is
to admit fewer young men, an approach taken by the Canadian government.18 However,
this approach may have severe humanitarian costs, as the threats facing young men are
often just as dire as threats facing other asylum seekers. Alternatively, policy makers
can prioritize cultural integration and public safety, undermining the source of opposition
to young immigrant men. Encouragingly, policy makers in Germany seem aware of this,
as 72% of the respondents to a survey of local elected officials indicated that language
training and education of refugees are very important goals (vhw 2016). Worryingly,
the same survey shows that policy makers may still be disconnected from the public’s
concerns, as only 32% of those surveyed indicated that public safety was a top priority.
For understanding the sources of opposition to immigration, this study shows specif-
ically which immigrants pose cultural and security threats. While earlier studies (Dan-
cygier and Donnelly 2013; Malhotra, Margalit and Mo 2013) have shown links between
specific groups of immigrants and perceptions of labor market threat, less has been stud-
ied about which immigrants pose the greatest cultural threat (but see Hopkins 2015).
My finding that young men pose these threats helps develop our understanding of these
cultural and security threats, and suggests that important work remains to be done in
understanding the attributes of young men which lead to these threats. For example, it
is important to know if young men are perceived as culturally threatening because they
are viewed as less likely to learn the language or as less likely to adopt local norms about
the treatment of women. More generally, my findings imply that important work remains
to be done in understanding the link between specific immigrants and specific types of
threat.
Additionally, this research shows that examining attitudes toward groups of immi-
grants, in addition to individual immigrants, has the potential to provide new insights. In
this study, considering attitudes toward groups has revealed opposition to young immi-
grant men which was not apparent in a study of individual immigrants. Studying groups
18“Canada will welcome 25,000 refugees, but no single straight men,” Newsweek (2015, November 24).
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makes sense on theoretical grounds, as tendencies to stereotype and beliefs about the
behavior of groups mean attitudes towards groups may differ than attitudes towards in-
dividuals. It is also practically relevant: immigrants often arrive, live, and are portrayed
in public debates as groups.
Finally, these findings imply that future migration events which include a dispropor-
tionate share of young men are likely to provoke substantial opposition among natives of
the immigrant receiving countries. Historically, such events have not been extremely rare.
For example, during the United States’ “age of mass migration” at the turn of the 20th
century, young men represented approximately 20% of the foreign-born population of the
United States.19 Similarly, during Germany’s “guest worker” programs of the 1950’s and
1960’s, young men were the primary group recruited (Ho¨hne et al. 2014). Given these
patterns in past migration events, it is likely that this trend of large shares of young men
will continue.
19https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab07.html. Young means
ages 15-34, based on 1900 estimates.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The preceding chapters have shown the impact of three features of localities on immigrant
integration. In each chapter, I have emphasized how local contexts matter by either
expanding or limiting the set of opportunities available to immigrants. Chapter 2 argues
that local governing parties do this through their handling of public resources and their
responsiveness to immigrants. Chapters 3 and 4 argue that immigrant diversity and the
share of young men in an immigrant population do this by impacting natives’ attitudes
toward immigrants. The empirical evidence I present to support these arguments shows
that local contexts have substantial effects, identifying localities that are governed by
parties of the left with immigrant populations that are diverse and not skewed toward
young men as providing the best conditions for integration.
Many important questions about local contexts remain open for future research. Chap-
ter 2 shows that integration is advanced by settlement in a left-governed municipality.
However, my measure of integration, out-migration, is likely measuring socioeconomic
integration more than political integration. Future research studying the impact of local
governing parties on political integration will be important, given that immigrants’ initial
interaction with the state may shape their beliefs about the long-term value of political
participation.
In Chapter 3, I develop a theory that links immigrant diversity to integration through
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diversity’s impact on natives’ attitudes. Diversity, however, is also likely to have impact
on immigrants’ behaviors in terms of their social networks, political mobilization, and
residence patterns. Future work that examines these mechanisms will reveal more about
the consequences of diversity and the causes of integration.
Unifying the chapters of this dissertation is the intuition that the settlement patterns
of immigrants within countries have important consequences for integration and public
attitudes toward immigrants. For policymakers, more careful attention to the design
and implementation of policies settling immigrants could therefore have significant im-
pacts. Nevertheless, future research identifying additional consequences of local contexts
is necessary to fully judge how effectively immigrant settlement policies meet the norma-
tive goal of ensuring equal opportunities for all immigrants to successfully integrate after
settlement.
69
Bibliography
Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort. 2010. “Identifying barriers
to Muslim integration in France.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
107(52):22384–22390.
Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort. 2014. “Muslims in
France: Identifying a Discriminatory Equilibrium.” Journal of Population Economics
27(4):1039–1086.
Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort. 2016. Why Muslim Integration
Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies. Harvard University Press.
Akay, Alpaslan, Amelie Constant, Corrado Giulietti and Martin Guzi. 2017. “Ethnic
diversity and well-being.” Journal of Population Economics 30(1):265–306.
Akkerman, Tjitske. 2012. “Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government: Immigra-
tion and Integration Policies in Nine Countries (1996-2010).” West European Politics
35(3):511–529.
Alesina, Alberto, Johann Harnoss and HIllel Rapoport. 2016. “Birthplace diversity and
economic prospoerity.” Journal of Economic Growth 21(2):101–138.
Algan, Yann, Alberto Bisin, Alan Manning and Thierry Verdier. 2012. Cultural Integration
of Immigrants in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bale, Tim. 2003. “Cinderella and her ugly sisters: the mainstream and extreme right in
Europe’s bipolarising party systems.” West European Politics 26(3):67–90.
70
Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Andre´ Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther and Nick
Sitter. 2010. “If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Re-
sponses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe.” Political
Studies 58:410–426.
Bale, Time. 2008. “Turning round the telescope. Centre-right parties and immigration
and integration policy in Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 15(3):314–330.
Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner. 2016. “How economic, hu-
manitarian, and religious concerns shape European attitudes toward asylum seekers.”
Science 354(6309):217–222.
Bechtel, Michael M. and Kenneth F. Scheve. 2013. “Mass support for global climate
agreements depends on institutional design.” Proceedings of the National Academcy of
Science 110(34):13763–13768.
Berman, Sheri. 2006. The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of
Europe’s Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press.
Blais, Andre, Donald Blake and Stephane Dion. 1993. “Do Parties Make a Difference?
Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies.” American Journal of
Political Science 37(1):40–62.
Bloemraad, Irene. 2013. “Accessing the Corridors of Power: Puzzles and Pathways to
Understanding Minority Representation.” West European Politics 36(3):652–670.
Bloemraad, Irene and Karen Scho¨nwa¨lder. 2013. “Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Rep-
resentation in Europe: Conceptual Challenges and Theoretical Approaches.” West Eu-
ropean Politics 36(3):564–579.
Bundesamt fu¨r Migration und Flu¨chtlinge. 2015. “Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2015: Asyl,
Migration und Integration.”.
71
Burns, Peter and James G. Gimpel. 2000. “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes,
and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 115(2):201–225.
Card, David, Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston. 2012. “Immigration, wages, and
compositional amenities.” Journal of the European Economic Association 10:78–119.
Christoffersen, Henrik and Martin Paldam. 2003. “Markets and Municipalitites: A study
of the behavior of the Danish Municipalities.” Public Choice 114:79–102.
Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Chrisopher Muste and Cara Wong. 1997. “Public Opinion
Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations.” Journal of Politics
59(3):858–881.
Damm, Anna Piil. 2009a. “Determinants of recent immigrants’ location choices: quasi-
experimental evidence.” Journal of Popular Economics 22:145–174.
Damm, Anna Piil. 2009b. “Ethnic Enclaves and Immigrant Labor Market Outcomes:
Quasi-Experimental Evidence.” Journal of Labor Economics 27(2).
Damm, Anna Piil and Christian Dustmann. 2014. “Does Growing Up in a High
Crime Neighborhood Affect Youth Criminal Behavior?” American Economic Review
104(6):1806–1832.
Dancygier, Rafaela M. 2010. Immigration and Conflict in Europe. Cambridge University
Press.
Dancygier, Rafaela M. 2013. “The Left and Minority Representation: The Labour Party,
Muslim Candidates, and Inclusion Tradeoffs.” Comparative Politics 46(1):1–21.
Dancygier, Rafaela M. and David D. Laitin. 2014. “Immigration into Europe: Economic
Discrimination, Violence, and Public Policy.” Annual Review of Political Science 17:43–
64.
72
Dancygier, Rafaela M. and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2006. “A New Electorate? Comparing
Preferences and Partisanship between Immigrants and Natives.” American Journal of
Political Science 50(4):962–981.
Dancygier, Rafaela M., Karl-Oskar Lindgren, Sven Oskarsson and K˚are Vernby. 2015.
“Why are Immigrants Underrepresented in Politics? Evidence from Sweden.” American
Political Science Review 109(4):703–724.
Dancygier, Rafaela M. and Michael J. Donnelly. 2013. “Sectoral Economies, Economic
Contexts, and Attitudes toward Immigration.” Journal of Politics 75(1):17–35.
Danish Refugee Council. 1987. Annual Report. Copenhagen: DRC.
Danish Refugee Council, Central Integration Unit (CIU). 1996. Danish Refugee Council
Integration Policy (Dansk Flygtningehjælps integrationsarbejde). Copenhagen: DRC.
de Graauw, Els and Floris Vermeulen. 2016. “Cities and the politics of immigrant integra-
tion: a comparison of Berlin, Amsterdam, New York City, and San Francisco.” Journal
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(6):989–1012.
Diehl, Michael and Klaus Jonas. 1991. “Measures of National Stereotypes as Predic-
tors of the Latencies of Inductive Versus Deductive Stereotypic Judgements.” European
Journal of Social Psychology 21(4):317–330.
Edin, Per-Anders, Peter Fredriksson and Olof A˚slund. 2003. “Ethnic Enclaves and the
Economic Success of Immigrants: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118(1):329–357.
Eggert, Nina and Katia Pilati. 2014. “Networks and political engagement of migrant
organisations in five European cities.” European Journal of Political Research 53:858–
875.
73
Fennema, Meindert and Jean Tillie. 1999. “Political participation and political trust in
Amsterdam: Civic communities and ethnic networks.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 25(4):703–726.
Fetzer, Joel S. 2000. Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France,
and Germany. Cambridge University Press.
Garbaye, Romain. 2005. Getting Into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in
British and French Cities. Blackwell.
Gerber, Elisabeth R. and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2011. “When Mayors Matter: Estimating the
Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy.” American Journal of Political Science
55(2):326–339.
Goodman, Sara Wallace. 2010. “Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake? Identi-
fying, Categorizing and Comparing Civic Integration Policies.” Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies 36(5):753–772.
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, Kees van Kersbergen and Anton Hemerijck. 2001. “Neo-
liberalism, the “Third Way” or What? Recent Social Democratic Welfare Policies in
Denmark and the Netherlands.” Journal of European Public Policy 8(2):307–25.
Ha, Shang E. 2010. “The Consequences of Multiracial Contexts on Public Attitudes
toward Immigration.” Political Research Quarterly 63(1):29–42.
Hainmueller, Jens. 2016. “Replication Data for: How Economic, Humanitarian, and
Religious Concerns Shape European Attitudes toward Asylum-Seekers.”.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KL0FDF
Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. “Public Attitudes Toward Immigration.”
Annual Review of Political Science 17:225–49.
74
Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2015. “The Hidden American Immigration
Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants.” American Journal
of Political Science 59(3):529–548.
Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J. Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. “Causal Inference
in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference
Experiments.” Political Analysis 22:1–30.
Hainmueller, Jens and Dominik Hangartner. 2013. “Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A
Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination.” American Political Science Review
107(1):159–187.
Hainmueller, Jens, Dominik Hangartner and Duncan Lawrence. 2016. “When lives are
put on hold: Lengthy asylum processes decrease employment among refugees.” Science
Advances 2(8).
Hainmueller, Jens, Dominik Hangartner and Giuseppe Pietrantuono. 2015. “Natural-
ization fosters the long-term political integration of immigrants.” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 112(41):12651–12656.
Hainmueller, Jens, Dominik Hangartner and Giuseppe Pietrantuono. 2017. “Catalyst
or Crown: Does Naturalization Promote the Long-Term Social Integration of Immi-
grants?” American Political Science Review pp. 1–21.
Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. “Educated Preferences: Explaining Indi-
vidual Attitudes Toward Immigration In Europe.” International Organization 61:299–
442.
Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and
Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment.” American Political
Science Review 104(1):61–84.
75
Hansen, Kasper M., Asmus L. Olsen and Mickael Bech. 2015. “Cross-National Yardstick
Comparisons: A Choice Experiment on a Forgotten Voter Heuristic.” Political Behavior
37(4):767–789.
Harmon, Nikolaj A. 2015. “Immigration, Ethnic Diversity and Political Outcomes: Evi-
dence from Denmark.” Unpublished Manuscript. University of Copenhagen.
Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy.” American Political
Science Review 71(4):1467–1487.
Hill, Thomas, Pawel Lewicki, Maria Czyzewska and Geoff Schuller. 1990. “The Role of
Learned Inferential Encoding Rules in the Perception of Faces: Effects of Nonconscious
Self-Perpetuation of a Bias.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 26:350–371.
Hilton, James L. and William von Hippel. 1996. “Stereotypes.” Annual Review of Psy-
chology 47:237–271.
Hochschild, Jennifer, Jacqueline Chattopadhyay, Claudine Gay and Michael Jones-Correa,
eds. 2013. Outsiders No More?: Models of Immigrant Political Incorporation. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Ho¨hne, Jutta, Benedikt Linden, Eric Seils and Anne Wiebel. 2014. “Die Gastarbeiter:
Geschichte und asktuelle soziale Lage.” WSI-Report 16.
Hopkins, Daniel J. 2010. “Politicized places: explaining where and when immigrants
provoke opposition.” American Political Science Review 104(1):40–60.
Hopkins, Daniel J. 2011. “Translating into Votes: The Electoral Impacts of Spanish-
Language Ballots.” American Journal of Political Science 55(4):814–830.
Hopkins, Daniel J. 2015. “The Upside of Accents: Language, Inter-group Difference, and
Attitudes toward Immigration.” British Journal of Political Science 45(3):531–557.
76
Howard, Marc Morje´. 2009. The Politics of Citizenship in Europe. Cambridge University
Press.
Huysmans, Jef. 2006. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Aslyum in the EU.
Routledge: London.
Imbeau, Louis M., Franc¸ois Pe´try and Moktar Lamari. 2001. “Left-right party ideology
and government policies: A meta-analysis.” European Journal of Political Research
40(1):1–29.
Just, Aida and Christopher J. Anderson. 2012. “Immigrants, Citizenship and Political
Action in Europe.” British Journal of Political Science 42(3):481–509.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. and Kees van Kersbergen. 2010. “Christian Democracy.” Annual
Review of Political Science 13:183–209.
Kitschelt, Herbet. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge
University Press.
Koopmans, Ruud. 2004. “Migrant mobilisation and political opportunities: variation
among German cities and a comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.”
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30(3):449–470.
Koopmans, Ruud. 2013. “Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Contested Field in Cross-
National Comparison.” Annual Review of Sociology 39:147–169.
Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laasko, Markku and Rein Taagepera. 1979. “Effective Number of Parties: a Measure
with Application to West Europe.” Comparative Political Studies 12(1):3–27.
Lahav, Gallya and Marie Courtemanche. 2012. “The Ideological Effects of Framing Threat
on Immigration and Civil Liberties.” Political Behavior 34:477–505.
77
Malhotra, Neil, Yotam Margalit and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. 2013. “Economic Explanations
for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional
Impact.” American Journal of Political Science 57(2):391–410.
Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2012. Ethnic Minority Migrants in Britain and France: Integration
Trade-Offs. Cambridge University Press.
Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2017. “Occupations, National Identity, and Immigrant Integration.”
Comparative Political Studies 50(2):232–263.
McLaren, Lauren M. 2003. “Anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe: Contact, threat per-
ception, and preferences for the exclusion of migrants.” Social Forces 81(3):909–936.
Meguid, Bonnie. 2005. “Competition Between Unequals: the Role of Mainstream Party
Strategy in Niche Party Success.” American Political Science Review 99(3):347–359.
Michon, Laure and Floris Vermeulen. 2013. “Explaining Different Trajectories in Im-
migrant Political Integration: Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam.” West European
Politics 36(3):597–614.
Mucchielli, Laurent. 2009. “Autumn 2005: A review of the most important riot in
the history of French contemporary society.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Stud-
ies 35(5):731–751.
Newman, Benjamin J. 2013. “Acculturating contexts and Anglo opposition to immigration
in the United States.” American Journal of Political Science 57(2):374–390.
OECD. 2017a. “Foreign-born population (indicator).”.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5a368e1b-en
OECD. 2017b. “Foreign-born unemployment (indicator).”.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ba5d2ce0-en
78
OECD. 2017c. “Native-born unemployment (indicator).”.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/0f9d8842-en
Pantoja, Adrian D., Ricardo Ramirez and Gary M. Segura. 2001. “Citizens by Choice,
Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos.” Polit-
ical Research Quarterly 54(4):729–750.
Park, Bernadette, Carey S. Ryan and Charles M. Judd. 1992. “The Role of Meaningful
Subgroups in Explaining Differences in Perceived Variability for In-Groups and Out-
Groups.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63(4):553–567.
Park, Bernadette, Charles M. Judd and Carey S. Ryan. 1991. “Social Categorization and
the Representation of Variability Information.” European Review of Social Psychology
2(1):211–245.
Pe´rez, Efren. 2010. “Explicit Evidence on the Import of Implicit Attitudes: The IAT and
Immigration Policy Judgements.” Political Behavior 32(4):517–45.
Putnam, Robert D. 2007. “E pluribus unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-
First century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture.” Scandinavian Political Studies
30(2):137–74.
Quattrone, George A. 1986. On the Perception of a Group’s Variability. In Psychology of
Integroup Relations, ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin. Chicago: Nelson-Hall
pp. 25–48.
Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. “Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Popu-
lation Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe.” American
Sociological Review 60(4):586–611.
Rich, Anna-Katharina. 2016. “Asylerstantragsteller in Deutschland im Jahr 2015: Sozial-
struktur, Qualifikations-niveau und Berufsta¨tigkeit.” BAMF-Kurzanalyse, Assgabe 3
.
79
Riek, Blake M., Eric W. Mania and Samuel L. Gaertner. 2006. “Intergroup Threat
and Outgroup Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review.” Personality and Social Psychology
Review 10(4):336–353.
Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. “Labor market competition and
individual preferences over immigration policy.” Review of Economics and Statistics
83(1):133–145.
Sides, John and Jack Citrin. 2007. “European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of
Identities, Interests and Information.” British Journal of Political Science 37:477–504.
Simon, Bernd and Ame´lie Mummendey. 1990. “Perceptions of Relative Group Size and
Group HOmogeneity: We Are the Majority and They Are All the Same.” European
Journal of Social Psychology 20:351–356.
Simon, Bernd, Pawel Mlicki, Lucy Johnston, Antonio Caetano, Miroslaw Warowicki, Ad
van Knippenberg and Richard Deridder. 1990. “The Effects of Ingroup and Outgroup
Homogeneity on Ingroup Favouritism, Stereotyping and Ouverestimation of Relative
Ingroup Size.” European Journal of Social Psychology 20:519–523.
Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hagendoorn and Markus Prior. 2004. “Predisposing Factors
and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities.” American
Political Science Review 98(1):35–49.
Statistics Denmark. 1992. Statistical Yearbook (Statistisk A˚rbog). Copenhagen: Statistics
Denmark.
Statistics Denmark. 1997. Statistical Yearbook (Statistisk A˚rbog). Copenhagen: Statistics
Denmark.
Statistics Denmark. 2000. Statistical Yearbook (Statistisk A˚rbog). Copenhagen: Statistics
Denmark.
80
Stephen, Walter G., Kurt A. Boniecki, Oscar Ybarra, Ann Bettencourt, Kelly S. Ervin,
Linda A. Jackson, Penny S. McNatt and C. Lausanne Renfro. 2002. “The Role of
Threats in the Racial Attitudes of Blacks and Whites.” Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy Bulletin 28(9):1242–1254.
Stephen, Walter G., Oscar Ybarra and Guy Bachman. 1999. “Prejudice Toward Immi-
grants.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 29(11):2221–2237.
Togeby, Lise. 1999. “Migrants at the polls: An analysis of immigrant and refugee participa-
tion in Danish local elections.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25(4):665–684.
Togeby, Lise. 2004. “It depends... how organisational participation affects political par-
ticipation and social trust among second-generation immigrants in Denmark.” Journal
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30(3):509–528.
Togeby, Lise. 2008. “The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Denmark as a
Deviant Case.” Party Politics 14(3):325–343.
Turper, Sedef, Shanto Iyengar, Kees aarts and Minna van Gerven. 2015. “Who is Less
Welcome?: The Impact of Individuating Cues on Attitudes towards Immigrants.” Jour-
nal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41(2):239–259.
Vernby, K˚are. 2013. “Inclusion and Public Policy: Evidence from Sweden’s Introduction
of Noncitizen Suffrage.” American Journal of Political Science 57(1):15–29.
vhw Bundesverband fu¨r Wohnen und Stadtentwicklung. 2016. “vhw-Kommunalbefragung
2016: Herausforderungen ,,Flu¨chtlingskrise vor Ort“.”.
White, Stephen, Neil Nevitte, Andre Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Patrick Fournier.
2008. “The Political Resocialization of Immigrants: Resistance or Lifelong Learning?”
Political Research Quarterly 61(2):268–281.
81
Appendix A: Additional Information
for Chapter 2
A.1 The Spatial Dispersion Policy
Beginning in 1986, the Danish government, via the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), im-
plemented a policy of spatial dispersion of refugees and asylum seekers who had been
given residence permits for the purpose of asylum (henceforth collectively referred to as
“refugees”). The policy was a response to the increasing number of refugees entering Den-
mark in the 1980s. Prior to the SDP, most refugees requested residence in Copenhagen,
Denmark’s capital and largest city. However, as the number of refugees increased, it be-
came increasingly difficult for the DRC to place refugees in Copenhagen. Consequently,
the SDP was introduced as a new method to settle refugees in municipalities across Den-
mark. It would remain in effect from 1986 until 1999, when a new policy was introduced.
During the period the SDP was in force, 76,673 individuals were granted refugee status
(Statistics Denmark 1992, 1997, 2000) and allocated across municipalities.
In implementing the SDP, the DRC first aimed to place refugees into counties such
that the proportion of placed refugees was equivalent to the county’s proportion of the
total population.1 Second, within counties, the DRC attempted to place refugees into
municipalities such that the number of refugees in a municipality was proportional to that
municipality’s share of the total county population (Danish Refugee Council 1996, pp. 8-
1In this period, Denmark was divided into 14 counties plus the two independent municipalities Copen-
hagen and Fredriksberg. All other municipalities were wholly within one of the 14 counties. The average
county population was 324,000 in the SDP period.
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9).2 Third, the DRC aimed to place refugees into municipalities with suitable reception
facilities, including adequate housing, educational institutions, employment opportunities,
and co-nationals. Consequently, the SDP’s goals led to refugees being placed primarily
in towns and cities, rather than rural ares. Additionally, the DRC attempted to place
refugees around co-ethnics in order to facilitate reception and well-being; this led to local
ethnic clusters of approximately 100 refugees within three year periods (Damm 2009b).3
Prior to being granted refugee status, asylum seekers lived in Red Cross reception
centers across Denmark. Upon receipt of asylum, the council assigned them to one of
Denmark’s counties within 10 days (Danish Refugee Council 1996, p. 9). Once refugees
were assigned to a county, the DRC’s local offices assigned them to a municipality and
they were given temporary housing while the DRV searched for permanent housing in the
municipality of assignment on the refugee’s behalf. After receiving asylum, refugees filled
out a questionnaire asking about basic personal information, such as date of birth, marital
status, number of children and nationality; this information was given to the DRC and
could have been used in the placement process. Conditional on this information, all of
which we observe in the administrative registers and include in our analysis, assignment
to a municipality was random. Note that this questionnaire did not provide information
about educational attainment, income, language skills, or job training, meaning that
placement decisions were not influenced by these important factors. Furthermore, there
was no face-to-face meetings between refugees and the DRC’s placement officials at which
refugees could give additional information to the council. Only the information contained
in the questionnaire was available to the council during placement.
In addition, the council did not consider individual location preferences in the as-
signment process . Resettlement requests were considered only after an individual had
moved to the original municipality of assignment (Damm and Dustmann 2014). Nor were
2Denmark was divided into 275 municipalities during this period, with an average municipal population
of 19,000 inhabitants.
3The DRC also prioritized placing families in larger housing units, which became increasingly difficult in
the larger cities as time went on, leading families to be disproportionately placed in smaller locations in
later years of the SDP (Damm 2009b).
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the preferences of the municipalities considered by the council. The council entered the
local housing market directly on behalf of refugees, and consequently municipal authori-
ties were not aware of a refugee’s placement until after settlement had occurred (Damm
2009a). These points reinforce the randomness of the first municipality of assignment; it
is this municipality whose political context we base our analysis on. Once placed, refugees
participated in an 18 month Danish course and received social benefits. The placements
were not binding: refugees were free to move to another municipality, if they could inde-
pendently find housing. Receipt of benefits was not conditional on residing in the assigned
municipality.
The SDP was largely successful. Though refugees were free to opt-out of dispersal
if they were able to find their own accommodation, approximately 90% of refugees in
this period were provided housing under the SDP (Damm 2009a). Among the 90% who
participated, almost all of them were successfully placed: only 0-4% of refugees did not
find permanent housing within the introductory 18 month period (Damm and Dustmann
2014). Consequently, within only two years of its implementation, there were refugees in
243 out of 275 municipalities in Denmark, and the geographical distribution of refugees
was quite similar to that of the overall population (Danish Refugee Council 1987, pp.
30-31).
A.2 Construction of the Refugee Sample
Though we have data on all individuals living in Denmark during the SDP period, the
administrative registers include do not an indicator of refugee status or participation in
the SDP. As such, we construct our sample of the total refugee population according to
the following algorithm. First, we define as refugees individuals who arrived between
1986 and 1998 from one of the following eight countries: Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Somalia,
Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia.4 These eight countries are considered
4We exclude refugees from the former Yugoslavia because these refugees were initially granted provisional
asylum and were subsequently subjected to a special dispersal policy implemented in 1993 (known as
the Bosnian program) (Damm and Dustmann 2014).
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because collectively they account for approximately 85% of the total number of refugee
permits issued in this period, and because the vast majority of immigrants from these
countries arrived with refugee permits.
Second, we include in our sample individuals who at their time of arrival were not
married to an individual from a non-refugee sending country or an individual from a
refugee sending country who had arrived at least one year earlier. These requirements
are imposed so that our sample includes only individuals subjected to the SDP. Third,
we include only individuals at least 18 years old at the time of arrival. We consider a
refugee’s first observed municipality to be their municipality of assignment under the SDP.
We exclude all refugees’ whose first observed municipality is the capital, Copenhagen,
from our sample because it is likely the location refugees who opt-out of the SDP would
have moved to. Thus, the exclusion of Copenhagen likely minimizes the contamination
of undisposed refugees in our sample. Finally, we include only the heads of household
in our sample, as briefly described in the main text. Heads of household are defined as
all non-married refugees, all married refugees not residing in the same municipality as
their partner, and for cohabiting couples, the partner that arrived in Denmark first. We
use only these individuals as our main outcome variable, out-migration, is a decision that
was likely made together by married couples. Excluding non-head of households thus
ensures that a single decision is not counted twice in our data. Following this algorithm,
we construct a refugee sample of 19,387 individuals.
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Appendix B: Additional Information
for Chapter 3
B.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics for Main
Analysis
This section presents the sources for all measures used in the main observational analy-
sis and in the reverse causality analysis. Tables B.1, B.2, and B.3 provide information
about the German data, which comes from the Federal Statistical Office (Statistiches
Bundesamt) or the Statistical Offices of the Federation and States (Statistiches Amter
des Bundes und der La¨nder). Tables B.4, B.5, and B.6 provide information about the
Danish data, which originates from Statistics Denmark.
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Table B.1: Details and Sources for German Variables
Immigrant Unemploy-
ment
Number of unemployed immigrants divided by the total
number of immigrants. Unemployed individuals are those
older than 15 years and younger than the retirement age (be-
tween 65 and 67 years) who are working less than 15 hours
a week and have registered with the authorities as seeking a
job. Source Tables: 659-71-4 and 12521-0040
Effective Number of
Immigrant Communities
(ENIC)
Calculated as 1/
∑
c2i , were ci is the share of the immigrant
population with citizenship from country i. Source Table:
12521-0040
Population The total population of a district. Source Table: 12411-0014
Population Density Total population (measured in thousands) divided by the
mean area of a district between 2001 and 2013 (measured
in square kilometers). The mean area is used as data on
area is unavailable for 2014 and because some districts’ areas
changed slightly overtime. Source Tables: 11111-0002 and
12411-0014
Immigrant Proportion Percentage of district’s population who are foreign-born.
Source Tables:12521-0040 and 12411-0014
Share Muslim Immi-
grants
Percentage of the immigrant population with citizenship
from a majority Muslim country. See Table SI 1.2 for a list of
countries identified as Muslim majority in the German data.
Source Table:12521-0040
Share Western Immi-
grants
Percentage of the immigrant population with citizenship
from a Western country. See Table SI 1.2 for a list of coun-
tries identified as Western in the German data. Source Table:
12521-0040
Unemployment Number of unemployed individuals divided by the total pop-
ulation. Unemployed individuals are the same as above.
Source Tables: 659-71-4 and 12411-0014
Urban District Indicator for districts designated as “Kreisfreie Stadt”
East Germany Indicator for districts in the five states of the former
German Democratic Republic (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Saxony-Anhlat, Saxony, and Thuringia)
Note: Table 659-71-4 is from the publicly accessible online database “Regionaldatenbank Deutsch-
land” produced by the Statistiche A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder (available at https://www.
regionalstatistik.de/genesis/online/). All other tables are from the publicly accessible online
database “GENESIS-Online Datenbank” produced by the Statistiches Bundesamt (Destatis; available at
https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online).
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Table B.2: Islamic and Western Country Coding in German Data
Islamic Countries:
Republic of Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gam-
bia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger,
Oman, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Stateless, Sudan (including South Sudan, until 2011-07-08), Sudan (without
South Sudan, since 2011-07-09), Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tu-
valu, United Arab Emirates, Unknown / Not specified, Uzbekistan, Yemen
Western Countries:
Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, New Zealand, Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vatican City State
Note: The codings for Denmark and Germany differ slightly as the list of countries included in each
country’s administrative records differs. Stateless and Unknown / Not specified are coded as Muslim as
many of these immigrants hail from the Palestinian Territories. Coding of countries was done by the
author.
Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics for German Data
Min. Median Mean Max Std. Dev. Missing
Immigrant Unemployment 0 7.187 7.561 21.474 3.005 0
ENIC 1.868 12.358 13.418 35.738 6.360 0
Population (in thousands) 33.944 137.010 194.651 3469.849 226.154 4
Population Density 0.365 1.989 5.141 46.036 6.677 4
Immigrant Proportion 0.006 0.056 0.068 0.464 0.052 4
Share Muslim Immigrants 0.042 0.321 0.328 0.708 0.113 0
Share Western Immigrants 0.104 0.411 0.415 0.839 0.119 0
Unemployment 0.012 3.844 4.542 14.747 2.505 4
N = 5, 789
Note: Data comes from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany and the Statistical Office of the Feder-
ation and States, and covers the period 2001-2004. Population density is measured as 1,000 people per
square kilometer.
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Table B.4: Details and Sources for Danish Variables
Immigrant Unemploy-
ment
Percentage of a municipality’s immigrant labor force
who are unemployed. Unemployed individuals are
those who are are out of work, but are still in the
labor force or receiving unemployment benefits (for
more detail on how individuals are classified as un-
employed see http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/
dokumentation/documentationofstatistics/
register-based-labour-force-statistics/
statistical-presentation). Source Tables: RAS1
Western Immigrant
Unemployment
Same as Immigrant Unemployment but including only im-
migrants from Western countries. See Table SI 1.4 for the
set of countries coded as Western. Source Tables: RAS1
Non-Western Immi-
grant Unemployment
Same as Immigrant Unemployment but including only im-
migrants from Non-Western countries. See Table SI 1.4 for
the set of countries coded as Non-Western. Source Tables:
RAS1
Effective Number of
Immigrant Communi-
ties (ENIC)
Calculated as 1/
∑
c2i , were ci is the share of the immigrant
population in a municipality originating from country i.
Source Table: BEF3
ENIC - Western Same as ENIC but including only immigrants from West-
ern countries. Source Table: BEF3
ENIC - Non-Western Same as ENIC but including only immigrants from Non-
Western countries. Source Table: BEF3
Population The total population of a municipality. Source Table:
BEF3
Population Density Total municipal population (measured in thousands) di-
vided by municipal area (measured in square kilometers).
Source Tables: ARE2 and BEF3
Immigrant Proportion Percentage of a municipality’s total population who are
immigrants or their descendants. Source Tables: BEF3
Western Immigrant
Proportion
Percentage of a municipality’s total population who are
Western immigrants or their descendants. Source Tables:
BEF3
Non-Western Immi-
grant Proportion
Percentage of a municipality’s total population who are
Non-Western immigrants or their descendants. Source Ta-
bles: BEF3
(Continued on next page)
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Share Muslim Immi-
grants
Percentage of the immigrant population with citizenship
from a majority Muslim country. See Table SI 1.4 for a
list of countries coded as Muslim majority in the Danish
data. Source Table: BEF3
Share Western Immi-
grants
Percentage of the immigrant population with citizenship
from a Western country. Source Table: BEF3
Unemployment Percentage of a municipality’s labor force who are un-
employed. See above for details on definition of “unem-
ployed”. Source Tables: RAS1
Copenhagen Area Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, and all municipalities in
Copenhagen county are coded as being in the Copenhagen
area.
Note: All tables are from the publicly accessible online database “Statbank” produced by Statistics
Denmark (available at http://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1280) Population com-
position data (BEF3) is available by origin country. Unemployment (RAS1) is only available by origin
country group (Western, Non-Western, and Danish)
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Table B.5: Islamic, Non-Western, and Western Country Coding in Danish Data
Islamic Countries:
Abu Dhabi, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Djibouti, Dubai, Egypt, The Gambia,
Guinea, Indochina, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyr-
gyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Middle East not stated,
Morocco, Niger, North Yemen, Not stated, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sene-
gal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Stateless, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Trucial Oman, Tunisia,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza,
Yemen
Non-Western Countries:
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, Soviet
Union, Turkey, Ukraine, Europe not stated, Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Re-
public, Congo, Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The
Gambia , Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Spanish territories in Africa, Saint Helena, Sudan, Swaziland, South
Africa, South Sudan, Southwest Africa, Tanzania, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zam-
bia, Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, Africa not stated, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, British West Indies, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, French West Indies, Grenada, Guadeloupe,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Netherlands Antilles, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mex-
ico, Nauru, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay,
Venezuela, West Indies, South and central America not stated, Abu Dhabi, Afghanistan,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Dubai, Philip-
pines, United Arab Emirates, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Indochina, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran,
Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Macao,
Malaysia, Maldives, Middle East not stated, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea,
Oman, Pakistan, West Bank and Gaza, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sikkim, Singapore, Sri
Lanka, South Korea, Syria, Tajikistan, Taiwan, Thailand, Trucial Oman, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, North Yemen, Yemen, Asia not stated, Cook Islands, Fiji, French
territories in the Pacific, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands,
Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, East Timor, Pacific Islands, Stateless, Not stated
(Continued on next page)
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Western Countries:
Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland,
Italy, Croatia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Nether-
lands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Switzerland,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, Sweden, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia,
GDR, Germany, Hungary, Vatican City State, Austria, Canada, USA, North America
not stated, Australia, New Zealand
Note: The codings for Denmark and Germany differ slightly as the list of countries included in each
country’s administrative records differs. Stateless and Not stated are coded as Islamic because many
immigrants in these categories are from the Palestinian Territories. The coding of countries as Western
and Non-Western is done by Statistics’ Denmark ; countries were coded as Islamic by the author.
Table B.6: Descriptive Statistics for Danish Data
Min. Median Mean Max Std. Dev. Missing
Immigrant Unemployment 0 11.801 12.946 78.169 7.113 0
Western Imm. Unemp. 0 8.831 9.819 40 5.951 0
Non-Western Imm. Unemp. 0 15.942 18.322 100 14.875 57
ENIC 1.215 9.651 10.184 35.284 4.715 0
ENIC - Western 1.147 7.402 7.227 14.749 2.389 0
ENIC - Non-Western 1 5.446 6.132 29.590 3.650 7
Population (in thousands) 2.091 10.032 19.041 502.362 37.304 0
Population Density 0.016 0.068 0.258 10.477 0.785 0
Immigrant Proportion 0.003 0.025 0.033 0.284 0.028 0
Western Imm. Prop. 0.002 0.013 0.016 0.116 0.011 0
Non-Western Imm. Prop. 0 0.009 0.016 0.261 0.023 0
Western Immigrant Share 0.083 0.608 0.609 1.000 0.216 0
Muslim Immigrant Share 0 0.177 0.216 0.796 0.184 0
Unemployment 1.355 6.471 6.762 20.318 2.981 0
N = 7, 129
Note: Data comes from Statistics Denmark and covers the period 1981-2006. Population density is
measured as 1000 people per square kilometer.
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B.2 Regression Tables Corresponding to Figures 3.3
and 3.4
Table B.7: Three Models of Immigrant Unemployment in Germany
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Full Sample West Germany East Germany
ENIC −0.051∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.017)
log(Population) 0.712∗∗∗ 0.155 1.867∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.133) (0.381)
log(Population Density) 0.677∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.167) (0.143) (0.432)
log(Immigrant Proportion) −3.712∗∗∗ −2.386∗∗∗ −6.287∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.121) (0.334)
Muslim Immigrant Share 4.580∗∗∗ −0.241 3.899∗
(0.709) (0.551) (1.799)
Western Immigrant Share 0.345 −1.909∗∗∗ −2.861∗
(0.621) (0.489) (1.195)
Unemployment 0.737∗∗∗ 1.966∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.069)
Urban District 2.469∗∗∗ −1.162∗∗∗ 6.913∗∗∗
(0.358) (0.300) (1.028)
East Germany −4.271∗∗∗
(0.484)
Intercept −16.766∗∗∗ −8.237∗∗∗ −45.928∗∗∗
(2.056) (1.791) (5.207)
NObservations 5,785 4,486 1,299
NDistricts 467 322 145
NStates 16 11 5
NYears 14 14 14
σy 1.018 0.283 1.544
σDistricts 1.896 0.881 4.217
σStates 0.512 1.589 0.956
σYears 0.489 0.241 4.327
Note: cell entries are coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses from multilevel linear
models fitted in R with lmer(). The dependent variable for all models is Immigrant Unemployment.
Data comes from the Federal Statistical Offices and the Statistical Offices of the Federation and States.
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
B.3 Regression Results for Øresund Bridge Analysis
I test the effect of the Øresund Bridge on integration and immigrant diversity by fitting
two OLS models. These models use the same municipal level Danish data from Statistics
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Table B.8: Three models of Immigrant Unemployment in Denmark
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
All Western Non-Western
Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants
ENIC −0.060∗∗
(0.021)
ENIC - Western −0.051
(0.041)
ENIC - Non-Western −0.466∗∗∗
(0.061)
log(Population) 0.786∗∗∗ 0.289 1.675∗∗
(0.217) (0.182) (0.583)
log(Population Density) −0.084 −0.204 −0.129
(0.188) (0.160) (0.488)
log(Immigrant Proportion) −0.414
(0.247)
log(Western Imm. Prop.) −1.353∗∗∗
(0.204)
log(Non-Western Imm. Prop) 2.180∗∗∗
(0.268)
Muslim Immigrant Share 5.468∗∗∗
(0.855)
Western Immigrant Share −8.607∗∗∗
(0.856)
Unemployment 1.683∗∗∗ 1.331∗∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.029) (0.099)
Intercept −2.641 −7.292∗∗∗ 0.977
(2.329) (1.864) (5.816)
NObservations 7,129 7,129 7,072
NMunicipalities 276 276 276
NCounties 16 16 16
NYears 26 26 26
σy 18.581 14.378 151.560
σMunicipalities 2.558 1.844 18.225
σCounties 0.235 0.191 1.803
σYears 1.272 0.218 2.880
Note: cell entries are coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses from multilevel linear
models fitted in R with lmer(). The dependent variable is Immigrant Unemployment in Model 1, and
the same for Western and Non-Western immigrants only in Models 2 and 3, respectively. Data comes
from Statistics Denmark. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Denmark as the main analysis. The identifying assumption for these models is that absent
the opening of the bridge, integration and immigrant diversity would have followed parallel
trends in the Copenhagen area and the rest of Denmark. Based on this assumption, these
models estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which in this context
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Table B.9: Regressions Estimates of the Effect of the Øresund Bridge’s Opening
Model 1: Model 2:
DV: Immigrant Unemployment DV: ENIC
Treatment −1.83∗ 0.09
(0.73) (0.43)
Intercept 16.96∗∗∗ 22.19∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.09)
Municipal F.E X X
Year F.E. X X
R2 0.72 0.94
N 1,100 1,160
Note: Cell entries are OLS estimates with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Data comes from
Statistics Denmark. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
is the average effect of the bridge opening on integration and immigrant diversity in the
Copenhagen area. The exact specification for these models is
Yi,t = α + γi + δt + ρDi,t + i,t,
where Y is one of two outcome variables, either Immigrant Unemployment or ENIC,
γi is a municipality fixed effect, δ is a year fixed effect, ρ is the effect of the Øresund
Bridge,  is the idiosyncratic error term, i indexes municipalities and t indexes years. The
variable D represents treatment, it is an interaction of the variable Copenhagen Area and
an indicator for t > 2000. To account for potential correlation among errors over time
within municipalities, I cluster standard errors at the municipal level. Table B.9 shows
the results of these models. The main finding is that there is a treatment effect of the
bridge on integration, as measured by Immigrant Unemployment, but no treatment effect
for immigrant diversity (as measured by ENIC ).
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B.4 Additional Details on Conjoint Survey Design
B.4.1 Sample
The survey was conducted online from December 23, 2016 to December 30, 2016. The
target population was German citizens aged 18-75. Respondents were provided by the
survey firm Respondi, who maintain a large panel of Germans. Based on demographic
records pre-collected by Respondi, panelists were invited to participate with the goal of
creating a sample that matches population margins on age, gender, state, and education.
Throughout the field period, the sample margins on these demographics were monitored,5
and invites were sent to panelists based on which groups were currently under- or over-
represented; however, hard quotas were not used during sampling. As described below,
survey weights were used to correct differences from the population margin. The final
sample included 2,136 respondents.
B.4.2 Demographic Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Five demographic variables were measured for each respondent: age (years), gender, state,
citizenship and highest completed education. All measures are self-reported. Respondents
were able to choose from 12 education levels:
1. Still in school
2. Special-needs school leaving certificate
3. Secondary school leaving certificate
4. Degree from polytechnic secondary school in the former German Democratic Re-
public
5. Intermediate school-leaving certificate
6. Entrance qualification for studies at universities of applied sciences
7. High school diploma which allows for university entrance
8. Degree in vocational education
9. Degree from a university of applied science (diploma, bachelor’s or master’s)
10. University degree (diploma, bachelor’s or master’s)
11. PhD
12. No completed education programs
5Monitoring was done using responses to demographic questions in the survey
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These levels were then grouped into six categories: None (levels 1 and 12), low-tier high
school education (levels 1, and 2), Vocational Education (level 8), medium-tier high school
education (levels 4 and 5), high-tier high school education (levels 6 and 7), and university
education (levels 9, 10, and 11). Table B.10 displays descriptive statistics for age, gender,
survey completion time (in seconds), and education.6
Table B.10: Respondent Descriptive Statistics
Min. Median Mean Max. Std. Dev. NA
Age (years) 18 49.5 48.1 100 15.05 0
Male 0 1 0.53 1 0.50 6
Completion Time 59 373 1,175 433,466 12,884 0
Education: None Low Vocational Medium High University
1% 20% 26% 21% 15% 17%
B.4.3 Sample Weights
As is common in internet panels, my sample deviates deviates from the demographic mar-
gins of the population. Specifically, in comparison to the population, men, low-education
individuals, and residents of North Rhine-Westphalia are overrepresented in my sample.
To correct for this, I fit post-stratification weights for my data using the function rake()
in the R package survey. I construct weights to achieve balance based on the population
margins among 18-75 year old Germans on four demographics: age, gender, education,
and state. Due to missing values on demographics or being outside the age range of the
target population, 35 respondents were dropped from the data when the weights were
created. These weights are used in my analysis. Model 2 in Table B.11 shows that the
results of my analysis are robust to using the unweighted data (and including respondents
of all ages), however.
6Statistics for citizenship are not shown; all non-German citizens were screened out of the survey.
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B.5 Regression Results for Conjoint Survey
Table B.11: Regression Results for the Conjoint Survey
Model 1: Model 2:
Weighted Unweighted
Intercept 0.483∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012)
Diversity:
Low −0.001 0.002
(0.011) (0.010)
High 0.046∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009)
Share of Young Men:
25% −0.025 −0.031∗∗
(0.013) (0.012)
50% −0.086∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012)
75% −0.181∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012)
100% −0.276∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012)
Share with University Education:
10% 0.083∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
20% 0.163∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
30% 0.219∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011)
R2 0.071 0.068
N 16,528 16,528
Note: The dependent variable is Settlement Preference. Estimates are from OLS regressions with standard
errors clustered by respondent. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Appendix C: Additional Information
for Chapter 4
C.1 Reanalysis of Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangart-
ner (2016)
Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2016, henceforth “BHH”) conduct a conjoint ex-
periment investigating attitudes toward asylum seekers among the public in 15 European
countries. Their conjoint includes numerous asylum seeker attributes: consistency of asy-
lum testimony, gender, country of origin, age, previous occupation, vulnerability, reason
for migrating, religion, and language skills. They measured two outcome variables of
interest. Forced Choice is a binary variable based on a question which asks respondents
which of the two asylum seekers in a trial they would prefer be allowed to stay in the host
country. Binary Rating is also a binary variable, based on a question asking respondents
how supportive (on a seven point scale) they would be for an asylum seeker to stay in the
host country. Responses of 5 or higher, i.e. above the mid point, were coded as 1. The
data from BHH’s experiment is available in Hainmueller (2016).
I reanalyze Hainmueller (2016) to assess if young male asylum seekers are particularly
preferred or opposed. BHH do not carry out such an analysis in their main text. In
the supplementary information, they do perform analyses of male and female asylum
seekers separately (see Figures S25 and S26) and analyses subsetting the data by asylum
seeker age (age was either 21, 38, or 62 years old; see Figures S31 and S32). However,
these subsample analyses make it difficult to compare attitudes toward young men with
attitudes toward asylum seekers of other age and gender combinations.
My analysis of Hainmueller (2016) includes coefficients for Gender ( 1 = Male, 0 =
Female) and Age (21, 38, or 62 Years Old) and their interactions. I exclude the other
profile attributes to simplify the analysis.7 Otherwise, my analysis exactly follows the
procedures reported in BHH: I use weighted OLS models with standard errors clustered
by respondents. Table C.1 reports the results of my analysis with separate models for
each of BHH’s two outcome variables.
The estimates show little evidence of particular polarization for or against young male
asylum seekers. In both models, male asylum seekers and old asylum seekers are penal-
ized, while 38 year old asylum seekers are not. Further, neither model shows evidence of
a large interactive effect. Only the coefficient for 62 year old men in the forced choice
7Random assignment of profile attributes means that this decision does not induce bias in my estimates
of attitudes toward young male asylum seekers.
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Table C.1: Interactive Effects of Age and Gender on Preferences over Asylum Seekers
DV: Forced Choice DV: Binary Rating
Male −0.062∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
38 Years Old −0.003 −0.004
(0.005) (0.004)
62 Years Old −0.067∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004)
Male × 38 Years Old −0.006 0.001
(0.007) (0.006)
Male × 62 Years Old 0.015∗ 0.007
(0.007) (0.006)
Intercept 0.552∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.006 0.002
N 178,740 178,740
Note: Estimates are from weighted OLS models with standard errors clustered by respondent. Data are
from Hainmueller (2016). ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
model is statistically significant, and the effect size is very small. To clarify how these
estimates relate to preferences over combinations of age and gender, Figure C.1 plots the
predicted probabilities of acceptance based on the forced choice model. These predicted
probabilities show that young male asylum seekers’ probability of acceptance is statisti-
cally indistinct from middle aged men and old women, and is significantly higher than old
men’s selection probability. Only young and middle aged women are preferred at higher
rates than young men. Altogether, this evidence leads to the conclusion that respondents
to BHH’s survey were not particularly opposed to or in favor of young male asylum seekers.
C.2 Details on Survey Design and Implementation
C.2.1 Randomization of Countries of Origin
The number of immigrants per country of origin were randomized as follows. First, one of
three vectors - (60,0,0,0,0,0), (30,20,10,0,0,0), (10,10,10,10,10,10) - was randomly chosen
for each profile. Second, the order of the six numbers in the chosen vector was randomized.
Finally, the randomly ordered set of six numbers were matched to the six origin countries
to represent the number of immigrants per country.
C.2.2 Attribute Order Randomization and Example Groups
As described in the main text, each immigrant group contained eight attributes: the
number of immigrants for each of the six origin countries, the share of young men in the
group, and the share of group members with a university education. When presented to
respondents, the origin countries were always presented first. The order of the six origin
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Figure C.1: Predicted Probabilities of Acceptance for Age and Gender Combinations
0.45 0.50 0.55
Predicted Probability of Acceptance
Old Men
Old Women
Middle Age Men
Middle Age Women
Young Men
Young Women
Note: Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around predictions. Predictions are based off the Forced
Choice model in Table C.1.
countries was randomly assigned once per respondent and then constant across the four
pairs of immigrant groups each respondent evaluated. Below the number of immigrants
per countries, the total number of immigrants in the group, which is always fixed at 60,
was displayed.
Below the origin country information, the other two attributes, young men and educa-
tion, were presented under a section titled “Group Traits.” The order of these attributes
was also randomly assigned for each respondent but then held constant across pairs of im-
migrant groups. An example of how the groups were presented to respondents is displayed
in Table C.2.
C.2.3 Survey Flow
Before beginning the conjoint tasks, respondents read an informed consent document and
answered demographic questions on age, citizenship, gender, education, and state. After
these, respondents were informed that they would be asked to compare four pairs of immi-
grant groups. In each task, respondents were asked seven items: the single forced choice
question, three rating questions about Group A, and three rating questions about Group
B. The forced choice item was always asked first, immediately below the group profiles.
Whether questions about Group A or Group B appeared second was randomized for each
pair of profiles. Within the questions about each group, the order of the three rating
scales (Economic Potential, Security Threat and Cultural Threat) were also randomized.
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Table C.2: Example Immigrant Groups
Group A Group B
Number of immigrants per country:
Syria 0 20
Afghanistan 0 0
Albania 0 30
Eritrea 60 0
Serbia 0 10
Nigeria 0 0
Total 60 60
Group Traits:
Share with university education 0% 30%
Share of male immigrants under age 25 75% 50%
Between each of the conjoint tasks, respondents were alerted that they were about to be
shown new groups.
C.2.4 Sample
The survey was conducted online from December 23, 2016 to December 30, 2016. The
target population was German citizens aged 18-75. Respondents were provided by the
survey firm Respondi, who maintain a large panel of Germans. Based on demographic
records pre-collected by Respondi, panelists were invited to participate with the goal of
creating a sample that matches population margins on age, gender, state, and education.
Throughout the field period, the sample margins on these demographics were monitored,8
and invites were sent to panelists based on which groups were currently under- or over-
represented; however, hard quotas were not used during sampling. As described below,
survey weights were used to correct differences from the population margin. The final
sample included 2,136 respondents.
C.2.5 Demographic Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Five demographic variables were measured for each respondent: age (years), gender, state,
citizenship and highest completed education. All measures are self-reported. Respondents
were able to choose from 12 education levels:
1. Still in school
2. Special-needs school leaving certificate
3. Secondary school leaving certificate
4. Degree from polytechnic secondary school in the former German Democratic Re-
public
8Monitoring was done using responses to demographic questions in the survey
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5. Intermediate school-leaving certificate
6. Entrance qualification for studies at universities of applied sciences
7. High school diploma which allows for university entrance
8. Degree in vocational education
9. Degree from a university of applied science (diploma, bachelor’s or master’s)
10. University degree (diploma, bachelor’s or master’s)
11. PhD
12. No completed education programs
These levels were then grouped into six categories: None (levels 1 and 12), low-tier high
school education (levels 1, and 2), Vocational Education (level 8), medium-tier high school
education (levels 4 and 5), high-tier high school education (levels 6 and 7), and university
education (levels 9, 10, and 11). Table C.3 displays descriptive statistics for age, gender,
survey completion time (in seconds), and education.9
Table C.3: Respondent Descriptive Statistics
Min. Median Mean Max. Std. Dev. NA
Age (years) 18 49.5 48.1 100 15.05 0
Male 0 1 0.53 1 0.50 6
Completion Time 59 373 1,175 433,466 12,884 0
Education: None Low Vocational Medium High University
1% 20% 26% 21% 15% 17%
C.2.6 Sample Weights
As is common in internet panels, my sample deviates deviates from the demographic mar-
gins of the population. Specifically, in comparison to the population, men, low-education
individuals, and residents of North Rhine-Westphalia are overrepresented in my sample.
To correct for this, I fit post-stratification weights for my data using the function rake()
in the R package survey. I construct weights to achieve balance based on the population
margins among 18-75 year old Germans on four demographics: age, gender, education,
and state. Due to missing values on demographics or being outside the age range of the
target population, 35 respondents were dropped from the data when the weights were
created. These weights are used for all analyses in the main text and the SI. Model 2 in
Table C.4 shows the robustness of the results of my main analysis to using the unweighted
data (and including respondents of all ages).
9Statistics for citizenship are not shown; all non-German citizens were screened out of the survey.
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C.3 Regression Tables for Main Results and Sub-
group Analyses
The tables in this section report the following results. First, Table C.4 presents the
estimates corresponding to Figure 4.1 in the main text, and also shows the robustness
of this model to using the unweighted data (which also includes respondents who were
older than the target population age range of 18-75 years). Second, Table C.5 shows the
results when the data is subset according to gender, age (all respondents above the median
age of 49 are coded as old), education (categories “High” and “University” are coded as
high; all other categories are coded as low) and region (East and West Germany). As
described in the main text, the main result of opposition to groups with many young
men, holds across all of the subgroups. Finally, Table C.6 presents regression estimates
corresponding to Figure 4.2 in the main text. Worth noting in Table C.6 are the estimated
effects of Education. Groups with more university educated members are perceived as (1)
more likely to contribute economically, (2) less likely to be a security threat, and (3) less
likely to be a cultural threat. These results correspond well with earlier studies showing
natives have favorable opinions toward educated immigrants (see Bansak, Hainmueller
and Hangartner 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015) and provide reassurance that the
three rating variables are measuring their intended concepts.
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Table C.4: Regression Results for Figure 4.1 and Unweighted Results
Model 1: Model 2:
Weighted Unweighted
Intercept 0.498∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010)
Share of Young Men:
25% −0.025 −0.029∗
(0.013) (0.011)
50% −0.086∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012)
75% −0.183∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012)
100% −0.276∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012)
Share with University Education:
10% 0.082∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
20% 0.162∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
30% 0.218∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011)
R2 0.069 0.066
N 16,528 16,790
Note: The dependent variable in both models is Settlement Preference. Estimates are from OLS models
with standard errors clustered by respondent. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table C.5: Results for Respondent Subgroups
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6: Model 7: Model 8:
Men Women Young Old High Low East West
Education Education Germany Germany
Intercept 0.492∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.029) (0.013)
Share of Young Men:
25% −0.009 −0.041∗ −0.023 −0.028 −0.029 −0.024 0.031 −0.037∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.016) (0.033) (0.014)
50% −0.089∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.046 −0.094∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.018) (0.040) (0.015)
75% −0.186∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.032) (0.016)
100% −0.255∗∗∗ −0.296∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.270∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.035) (0.016)
Share with University Education:
10% 0.081∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.067∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.015) (0.032) (0.013)
20% 0.161∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.034) (0.013)
30% 0.213∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) (0.034) (0.014)
R2 0.064 0.074 0.079 0.058 0.090 0.061 0.072 0.070
N 8,674 7,854 8,436 8,092 5,408 11,120 2,516 14,012
Note: The dependent variable in all models is Settlement Preference. Estimates are from weighted OLS models with standard errors clustered by
respondent. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table C.6: Regressions Results for Figure 4.2
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:
Economic Security Cultural
Potential Threat Threat
Intercept 0.221∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Share of Young Men:
25% 0.004 0.016 0.020
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
50% −0.002 0.049∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
75% 0.005 0.087∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
100% −0.009 0.117∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Share with University Education:
10% 0.022∗ 0.003 0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
20% 0.009 −0.034∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
30% 0.052∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
R2 0.002 0.011 0.007
N 16,677 16,659 16,672
Note: Estimates are from weighted OLS models with standard errors clustered by respondent. ∗∗∗p <
0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
C.4 Details about Mechanical Turk Pilot Study
For the purpose of refining the survey instrument, I conducted a pilot study of my con-
joint experiment on a sample of 200 American respondents from Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk in September 2016. In the pilot study, each respondent evaluated six pairs of immi-
grant groups. Prior to completing the conjoint tasks, respondents answered a battery of
demographic questions. Respondents were paid $0.25 for completing the survey, and on
average, the survey took respondents six minutes to complete.
The conjoint used in this pilot study differed from the conjoint in the main study
in the following ways. First, the six origin countries reflect immigration to the United
States instead of Germany, as were: the Dominican Republic, India, Mexico, Nigeria, the
Philippines, and Syria. Second, the possible distributions of the 60 immigrants across the
6 origin countries were: (60, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,). (40, 20, 0, 0, 0, 0), (30, 20, 10, 0, 0, 0), (20,
20, 20, 0, 0, 0), (15, 15, 15, 10, 5, 0), and (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10). Third, two additional
attributes were presented for each group, their work experience (<1 year, 1 year, 3 years,
and 5 years), and the share with basic English skills (0%, 10%, 20%, and 30%).
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The main outcome from the pilot study - Settlement Preference - is similar to the
outcome from the main study. For each pair of immigrant groups, respondents were
asked “Which of these groups of immigrants would you prefer settle in your community?”
Groups preferred for settlement were coded as 1, while groups not preferred were coded as
0. To analyze the responses to the pilot, I fit an OLS model with standard errors clustered
by respondent. The attributes included in this model are Young Men, Education, Work
Experience and English Skills. The results of this model are shown in Table C.7.
In Table C.7, the estimates for the levels of Young Men are of primary interest. As in
the main study, groups with many young men are preferred for settlement at lower rates.
Specifically, groups with 75% and 100% young men suffer penalties of approximately 7
and 11 percentage points, respectively. The Mechanical Turk respondents appear less
opposed to groups with small numbers of young men than the German respondents,
however: groups with 25% and 50% young men are not selected at rates significantly
different than groups with no young men. These results suggest that opposition to young
men is (1) not exclusive to the German context but also (2) potentially less strong outside
of Germany.
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Table C.7: Results from Mechanical Turk Pilot Study
Model 1
Intercept 0.255∗∗∗
(0.039)
Share of Young Men:
25% 0.030
(0.031)
50% −0.006
(0.033)
75% −0.068∗
(0.033)
100% −0.108∗∗
(0.037)
Share with University Education:
10% 0.037
(0.028)
20% 0.117∗∗∗
(0.029)
30% 0.182∗∗∗
(0.029)
Amount of Work Experience:
1 year 0.068∗
(0.028)
3 years 0.124∗∗∗
(0.029)
5 years 0.173∗∗∗
(0.032)
Share with English Skills:
10% 0.072∗
(0.029)
20% 0.142∗∗∗
(0.033)
30% 0.194∗∗∗
(0.034)
R2 0.069
N . 2,352
Note: Estimates are from a weighted OLS model with standard errors clustered by respondent.The
omitted categories are 0% (Young Men, Education, and English Skills) and < 1 year (Work Experience).
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Appendix D: Pre-Analysis Plan for
Conjoint Survey
Note: What follows is the exact text of the pre-analysis plan for the conjoint survey ex-
periment analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation. The pre-analysis plan was
registered with EGAP on November 11, 2016, and is available at http: // egap. org/
registration/ 2258 . An amendment was made to the pre-analysis plan on December
13, 2016, prior to the implementation of the study; this amendment was due to a change
in sample provider and is described at the end of this appendix. EGAP was notified of
this amendment, but did not update the published pre-analysis plan accordingly.
This pre-analysis plan describes the experimental component of “Immigrant Diversity
and Native Attitudes Towards Immigration”. This project investigates the role of diversity
among immigrants in native’s attitudes towards immigration, making the argument that
diversity among immigrants makes natives more tolerant and welcoming of natives. This
document proceeds as follows. First, I describe the background and rationale of the study.
In this section I clearly state my hypotheses of key theoretical interest. Next, I outline the
design of the experiment, a conjoint survey. Third, I describe the implementation of the
survey in Germany, in cooperation with Respondi. Fourth, I describe my analysis plan,
which is based on a series of regressions. I conclude with a power analysis that indicates
my experiment is sufficiently powered to test my hypotheses.
D.1 Background and Explanation of Rationale
Fully understanding why and when immigrants are able to integrate also requires under-
standing the determinants of natives’ attitudes towards immigrants. These attitudes can
impact the immigration positions of parties and the ease with which immigrants are able
to integrate. As such, the determinants of these attitudes have been a main topic in the
immigration literature. One set of scholars has investigated the link between an economic
threat posed by immigrants and natives’ attitudes towards immigrants (Hainmueller and
Hiscox 2010; Malhotra, Margalit and Mo 2013; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). This line
of research has strong theoretical underpinnings, yet has often had inconclusive findings.
The other major strand of this literature shows a strong link between concerns of cultural
threat and anti-immigrant attitudes (Card, Dustmann and Preston 2012; Citrin et al.
1997; Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Sides and Citrin 2007). Studies have specifically
shown that immigrants seen as failing to integrate culturally (Sniderman, Hagendoorn
and Prior 2004) and not attempting to learn the native language (Hopkins 2015) can spur
anti-immigrant attitudes among natives.
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The impact of local contexts on attitudes towards immigrants has also received atten-
tion in the literature. The key variable in this literature has been proximity to immigrant
groups, with arguments suggesting this will reduce negative stereotypes (Fetzer 2000;
McLaren 2003), that proximity’s effect is conditional on demographic changes (Hopkins
2010; Newman 2013), or that this effect varies by group (Ha 2010). Results in this litera-
ture, often focused on Hispanic immigrants in the United States, are often contradictory.
This project argues that this focus on proximity and group size misses an important
characteristic of local immigrant communities: diversity among immigrants at a local
level. In short, I argue that low levels of immigrant diversity, in terms of ethnic group
or national origin, prevent immigrants from contributing to the economy, decrease the
pressure on immigrants to culturally adapt to their new country, and increase fears about
crime. All three mechanisms are expected to have the same effect on natives: increase
their opposition to immigrants.
Diversity matters for immigrant’s contribution to the local economy through three
channels. First, diversity impacts the size and density of immigrants social networks:
in a homogenous community, most immigrants will be able to draw upon a much larger
and denser social network. This network will provide access several goods and services
at a lower cost than they could be obtained normally; this should decrease immigrant’s
incentive to participate in the labor market. Second, immigrants in a high-diversity
context, without access to a dense network of co-ethnics, will be more likely to want
to actively participate in the labor market, as a way of increasing their social network
and to become part of the community. Third, immigrants in a high-diversity context are
likely to have a more diverse set of skills and skill levels. This diverse skill set means
that immigrants will be able to more efficiently integrate in the labor market, as they are
less likely to be competing with one another for a fixed amount of positions in a single
sector of the economy. Through these channels, there is clearly more potential for diverse
immigrant communities to positively contribute to the local economy. This increased
potential for economic contribution should ease native’s concerns about immigration.
Immigrant diversity also impacts the pressure on immigrants to adapt culturally.
When a community’s immigrants come from a variety of origin countries, it becomes more
likely that immigrants will have jobs with natives or immigrants from other countries. It
also becomes less likely that they will be able to shop at stores run by co-nationals, and
opportunities for socializing with co-nationals will be fewer. Hence, learning the language
of the new country becomes more important for success economically and socially. In
contrast, when diversity is low, immigrants can more easily get by without learning the
language of their new country. Furthermore, enclaves will not only be more likely to exist,
but will also be larger when immigrants are less diverse. In turn, this means immigrants
will be spending more time with co-nationals, thereby reducing the pressure for them to
adapt to native cultural norms. This argument suggests that decreasing immigrant diver-
sity makes it easier for immigrants to forgo cultural adaptation. Following the literature
on cultural threat (Citrin et al. 1997; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004), this will
increase natives’ level of cultural threat and increase natives’ opposition to immigration.
Finally, I argue that low diversity among immigrants can lead natives to have increased
anxiety about crime and security. A low-diversity situation increases the likelihood that
natives will be repeatedly encounter the same distinct other group, leading to the devel-
opment of “us-vs-them” group identities. These sort of social identities cause fear and
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distrust towards members of the out-group, a manifestation of which is a fear that the
out group will perpetrate crime against one’s group. In addition, the denser social net-
work of low-diversity immigrant communities means that marginalized immigrants are
more likely to come into contact with other marginalized immigrants. These clusters of
marginalized immigrants create opportunities for radicalization, and can become fertile
recruiting grounds for terrorist and criminal organizations. In contrast, a more diverse im-
migrant community prevents fewer opportunities for marginalized immigrants to cluster,
preventing these opportunities for radicalization. Homogenous immigrant communities
can also more easily overcome collective action costs and have less to fear from exclusion
or retribution by natives than immigrants belonging to one of many small groups in a lo-
cality. As a consequence, it may be easier for frustrations among homogenous immigrant
communities to boil over into protests or riots, which threaten the security of natives. To-
gether, these arguments suggest that there are reasons natives should be more concerned
about crime and security when immigrant communities are homogenous as opposed to
heterogenous. It follows that low diversity will provoke opposition to immigration.
D.2 Hypotheses to Be Tested
The primary hypothesis of this study is that opposition to immigration will be lower when
immigrant communities are more diverse. The chief mechanisms that I argue this effect
operates through are reducing the perceptions of threat held by natives about immigrant
integration. As such, I also have three secondary hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that
highly diverse immigrant communities lead natives to feel more positive about immigrants
potential contribution to the local economy. Second, I hypothesize that a low-diversity
immigrant community is likely to provoke more cultural threat than a high-diversity
community. Third, I hypothesize that natives will see immigrants as posing less of a threat
to their safety when immigrant communities are more diverse. I now turn to explaining
a survey experiment that I will use to test my primary and secondary hypotheses.
D.3 Experimental Design
The experiment is a choice-based conjoint design carried out in a survey context. Con-
joint experiments have been successfully used in political science research (e.g. Bechtel
and Scheve 2013; Hansen, Olsen and Bech 2015), especially in the study of immigration
attitudes (e.g Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2016).
These experiments elicit respondents’ preferences over the individual dimensions of some
multidimensional phenomenon by repeatedly asking respondents which of of multiple ex-
amples of the phenomenon they prefer. In the current context, respondents are asked
to rate groups of immigrants for settlement in the respondent’s community. I will show
respondents two immigrant group profiles, including information on origin countries, ed-
ucation, age and gender of the immigrants. Below the two profiles, I will ask respondents
a series of questions about their preferences and opinions on the groups.
After being shown a consent information letter, answering demographic questions10
and reading a brief introduction, each respondent will rate four pairs of immigrant groups,
10Demographic question wording is shown in the appendix.
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with each new choice task on a new screen. There are nine attributes per immigrant group.
The first seven attributes describe to the group’s composition by origin country, and it
is here that the level of diversity - the treatment of primary theoretical interest - is de-
termined. First, Group Size is fixed at 60 for all groups. This is done to isolate the
effect of immigrant diversity separate from the size of an immigrant group. The next six
attributes describe the number of immigrants from each of six countries: Afghanistan, Al-
bania, Eritrea, Nigeria, Serbia, and Syria. The order in which the countries are presented
is randomized across respondents but is contrast for each respondent across his/her four
comparisons.
The number of immigrants per country is determined by the Diversity treatment,
which is randomly selected as one of Low, Medium, or High for each profile. The different
Diversity treatments are each ways of dividing the total group size, 60, into six parts.
These six parts are then the number of immigrants per country for the group. Table D.1
shows how each of these three treatments divides 60 into six parts. The Low diversity
treatment assigns all 60 immigrants a single country. In the Medium diversity treatment,
three of the six countries are represented in the group, although one country clearly makes
up a larger share of the group than the other two. The High diversity treatment max-
imizes diversity, as all countries are represented in the group in equal size. Once the
Diversity treatment is selected, the order of the six numbers is randomized and presented
to respondents alongside the country names.
Table D.1: Three Diversity Scenarios
Low Medium High
Country 1 60 30 10
Country 2 0 20 10
Country 3 0 10 10
Country 4 0 0 10
Country 5 0 0 10
Country 6 0 0 10
Total 60 60 60
Note: Cells represent numbers of immigrants.
The diversity treatment has the appealing aspect that it is rather subtle. Respondents
will be required to look at multiple pieces of information to draw the inference that one
group is more diverse than the other. This corresponds with my theoretical argument:
high diversity indirectly leads natives to see immigration more favorably, by leading to
improved expectations of integration. Hence, my argument is not that there is an innate
preference for diversity for diversity’s sake. In fact, that there may be such an effect is an
additional reason to use a subtle diversity treatment such as this. By eschewing a more
direct statement about diversity in the group, I minimize the chance that my treatment
captures some intrinsic value respondents place on diversity.
The other two attributes in my conjoint study are Education and Young Men, selected
because they are both heuristics for multiple types of threats natives feel about immi-
gration. Education describes the share of the group with a university education. This is
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Table D.2: Example Immigrant Groups
Group A Group B
Number of immigrants per country:
Syria 0 30
Afghanistan 0 20
Albania 60 0
Eritrea 0 10
Nigeria 0 0
Serbia 0 0
Total 60 60
Group Traits:
Share with university education 0% 20%
Share of male immigrants under age 25 25% 50%
randomly selected from 0%, 10%, 20% and 30%. Education levels are a good heuristic
for integration potential in economic and cultural realms, and it is known that highly
educated immigrants are generally preferred (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). Young
Men, which is the share of men under age 25 in the group, is randomly selected from 0%,
25%, 50%, 75% and 100%. I include this attribute to tap into both security and cultural
concerns of natives. Due to the 2015 New Year’s Eve assaults in Cologne and fears about
ISIS members entering Europe during the 2015 migrant wave more generally, immigrant
communities containing large numbers of young men are likely to be more make natives
question their security. Further, to the extent that young males are likely to either start
families or seek to have their spouses follow them to the host country in the coming years,
they will also induce fears of cultural threat.
These two attributes are in the experiment for two reasons. First, these attributes
make my test of diversity’s effect harder. As I describe above, the Diversity treatment
is rather subtle. In contrast, Education and Young Men are easily used heuristics that
require respondents to process only a single piece of information. If my experiment reveals
an effect of diversity on attitudes even when presented alongside these two more easily
accessed pieces of information, we can have more confidence in the results. Second, the
inclusion of these two attributes will allow for an assessment of the relative importance
of diversity in driving attitudes towards immigrants. Note, I do not include these two
attributes to directly test their effects on support or opposition towards immigrant groups,
and do not state any specific hypothesis about their effects.
The nine pieces of information about immigrants are presented to respondents as
follows. First, the breakdown of each immigrant group by country is always presented.
Next is either Education or Young Men; the order of these two traits is randomized across
respondents and then held constant across the choice tasks. The two immigrant groups
are referred to as “Group A” and “Group B” in the description of the characteristics
and in the questions that follow. Table D.2 below presents an example of the immigrant
groups respondents will see.
After viewing the two immigrant group profiles, respondents are asked seven items
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per comparison task. First, they are asked to choose which of the two groups they prefer
to be settled in their community. Then, for each group respondents will be asked how
much they agree/disagree with three statements. First is that the group would be a safety
concern in the respondent’s community. Second is that the group will adapt well to the
respondent’s culture. Finally, is a statement that the immigrants will take jobs away from
locals. These agree/disagree questions are each on seven-point scales. The order of these
statements along with whether the statements about Group A or Group B are presented
first is randomized in every comparison. These three items allow me to investigate the
mechanisms through which diversity impacts natives’ attitudes. Specifically, they allow
me to see if fears about cultural differences, crime, or job loss are impacted by diversity.
The exact wording of the questions along with the introduction text for the survey are
included in the appendix at the end of this plan.
D.4 Experiment Implementation
I will implement my experiment by contracting with Respondi. The experiment will be
administered to a sample of 2,000 Adult, voting-eligible German respondents from their
German panel, with representativeness on age, gender, state, and education. It will be in
the field for 10 days, during December 2016. Respondi will provide only the sample; the
survey itself will be hosted on Qualtrics. Respondents will be screened based on age and
citizenship; those 17 years and younger or without German citizenship will be screened
out. The experiment was approved by the Washington University Institutional Review
Board. The experiment will be administered in German; translation was performed by
the author.
D.5 Main Tests
To analyze the results of the conjoint experiment, I will run a series of linear regressions.
The unit of analysis in each model will be the respondent-profile dyad. There will be
2000 respondents × 4 comparison tasks × 2 profiles per task = 16,000 observations in
the final analysis (minus observations are dropped due to non-response on the outcome
variable). The quantity of interest in the analysis is the average marginal component effect
(ACME), as described by Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014). The ACME for
each immigrant group attribute is how this impacts the group’s probability of being
preferred for settlement or their rating on the scale questions. Note that by design, the
effect of the number of immigrants from each individual country is not identified. This
is because the number of immigrants per country are forced to sum to 60, meaning that
the number of immigrants from any one country is a linear function of the other five
countries. Consequently, the individual country effects are not estimated in the analysis.
The identified effects of interest are the ACME’s of Diversity, Education, and Young Men.
Because the assignment of these attributes to profiles is fully randomized, these quan-
tities can be estimated through OLS regression, where each attribute enters as a series of
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dummy variables. Thus, I will fit regressions of the following form:
Y = α + ρ1Diversity = Low + ρ2Diversity = High
+ γ1Education = 10% + γ2Education = 20% + γ3Education = 30%
+ δ1Young Men = 25% + δ2Young Men = 50%
+ δ3Young Men = 75% + δ4Young Men = 100% + 
where Y a placeholder for one of the four outcome variables, and Diversity, Education,
and Young Men each enter as a series of dummy variables. For the profile choice ques-
tion, the outcome variable is coded as 1 for the selected group and 0 for the unselected
group. The three agree/disagree questions are the other outcome variables. They are
all measured on 1-7 scales, coded from 1 for “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree”.
For the three attribute categories, the excluded categories will be medium diversity, 0%
education, and 0% young men. The estimated parameters ρ, γ, and δ are thus the AMCE
of each of the levels of the attributes, in comparison to their respective baseline level.
Finally,  represents a respondent-profile level error term. Standard errors are clustered
by respondent, to account for correlated errors across a respondent’s tasks and for the
fact that within a task, when one profile is chosen, the other is, by design, not chosen.
Further, the regressions will be weighted to account for differences between the sample
and population on age, gender, state, and education. Two sided hypothesis tests will be
used to test the significance of the ACMEs of the attribute levels. Additionally, I will
conduct F tests for the joint significance of all the levels for each of the three attributes
(Diversity, Education, and Young Men).
For the purpose of assessing the primary hypothesis of my study, I will rely on the
effects of Diversity in the models with the binary profile choice outcome and the settlement
scale outcomes. To test my three secondary hypothesis, I will rely on the effects of
Diversity in the models with the outcome as one of the three agree/disagree items about
economic, cultural, and security threats. For both the primary and secondary hypotheses,
the prediction in terms of parameter estimates is ρ1 < 0, ρ2 > 0, and hence that ρ1 < ρ2.
D.6 Power Analysis
My study will have a sample size of 2,000 respondents, which when combined with my
conjoint analysis yields a dataset of 16,000 observations. To ensure that this will be a
sufficient number of respondents to detect the effects of diversity, I conducted a simulation
based power analysis. In this simulation, I considered sample sizes between 100 and
5,000 in intervals of 100. For each sample size, I created and analyzed 100 simulated
datasets. These datasets have the binary profile choice variable as the outcome, and
do not account for the other attributes in my study, Education and Young Men. Each
dataset has n × 4 × 2 observations, as in my study. Further, the simulations account
for the correlation resulting from the forced choice outcome by simulating the outcome
variable in pairs, and requiring each pair to sum to one. In other words, I randomly
select the outcome variable for all of the odd numbered observations, and then select the
subsequent even numbered observation so that the pairs sum to one. I also record in the
simulation which observations correspond to each simulated respondent; this allows me
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to fit clustered standard errors, as I will do in my actual analysis.
The power analysis considered the three hypotheses above: ρ1 < 0, ρ2 > 0, and
ρ1 < ρ2. For each set of 100 datasets, I recorded the proportion offering statistical
support that (a) either ρ1 < 0 or ρ2 > 0, (b) both ρ1 < 0 and ρ2 > 0 and (c) ρ1 < ρ2.
To do this a fit a single linear model including coefficients for ρ1 and ρ2. Also, to account
for the correlated outcomes within each choice task, all of the models are fitted using
standard errors clustered by (simulated) respondent. The hypotheses in the simulation
analysis are tested at the α = 0.05 level. The appendix includes the code used for these
analysis.
The power analysis requires assumptions about the effect of diversity. First, because I
do not have a strong prior about the magnitude of the differences in diversity represented
by my treatments, I assume that the magnitude of ρ1 and ρ2 are equal. Second, I need to
assume the effect sizes of ρ1 and ρ2. To do this, I draw on the estimated effects from other
conjoint analyses, notably Hainmueller and Hopkins’ (2015) article. They find significant
effect sizes ranging in magnitude from approximately .05 to 0.2. For the purpose of this
power analysis, I assume that if diversity has an effect, it will be of a similar magnitude
as the effects Hainmueller and Hopkins found. To be conservative, I choose the lower
bound of the their effects, and set ρ1 = −0.05 and ρ2 = 0.05 for the purposes of the
power analysis. Figure D.1 displays the results of this power analysis. As can be seen,
my experimental design is sufficiently powered with a sample size of 2,000 to uncover ρ1
and ρ2 estimates of magnitude 0.05.
Figure D.1: Power Analysis Results for Immigrant Diversity Experiment
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Note: Results of 100 simulated datasets per sample size. Gray line indicates conventional .8 power level.
D.7 Explanation of Amendment
This is the second version of this pre-analysis plan posted on EGAP. The main change in
this amended version is the change of survey firm with whom I will implement the study.
Previously, I was going to implement the study through YouGov. This has now been
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changed to Respondi. The change to Respondi also necessitated the addition of screening
measures, to ensure that respondents to the survey meet qualifications for participation
(over 18 years of age and hold German citizenship). The only other change in this amended
version is that one of the items in the agree/disagree question matrices was was dropped
from the survey. Specifically, the question about whether respondents agree/disagree that
the group should be settled in their community was dropped, as the researchers felt this
question was too similar to the forced profile choice question and because the researchers
wanted to make the survey slightly shorter.
D.8 Survey Wording
D.8.1 English Original
Survey Introduction
We’re interested in your opinions about different groups of immigrants. We will present
you with a series of pairwise comparisons of two groups of immigrants. Please review this
information carefully and answer the questions that follow. We’ll ask you to repeat this
exercise of pairwise comparisons of immigrant groups four times.
Demographics
1. Please state your gender.
2. In what year were you born?
3. In which federal state do you live?
4. What is the highest education level you have completed?
Question Wording
1. If you had to choose between them, which of these two groups would you prefer be
settled in your community?
Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements for Group X:
2. Group X would be a safety concern for my community.
3. Group X would adapt well to German culture.
4. Few members of Group X will find jobs in my community.
D.8.2 German Translation
Survey Introduction
Als na¨chstes interessieren wir uns fu¨r Ihre Meinungen zu verschiedenen Einwander-
ergruppen. Wir stellen Ihnen dazu eine Reihe paarweiser Vergleiche von zwei Einwan-
derergruppen vor. Bitte lesen Sie diese Information sorgfa¨ltig und beantworten Sie die
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folgenden Fragen. Wir werden Sie bitten, vier solcher Vergleiche vorzunehmen.
Demographics
1. Geben Sie bitte Ihr Geschlecht an.
2. In welchem Jahr sind Sie geboren?
3. Bitte geben Sie das Bundesland an, in dem Sie wohnen.
4. Welchen ho¨chsten Bildungsabschluss haben Sie?
Question Wording
1. Wenn Sie sich entscheiden mu¨ssten, welche Gruppe wu¨rden Sie als Nachbarn in Ihrer
Gegend vorziehen?
Bitte geben Sie an wie sehr Sie folgenden Aussagen u¨ber Gruppe X zustimmen
oder nicht zustimmen
2. Gruppe X wu¨rde ein Sicherheitsrisiko in meiner Gegend darstellen.
3. Gruppe X wu¨rde gut mit der deutschen Kultur zurechtkommen.
4. Wenige Mitglieder von Gruppe X wu¨rden Arbeitspla¨tze in meiner Gegend finden.
D.9 Power Analysis Code
rm(list=ls())
#install.packages("multiwayvcov")
#install.packages("coeftest")
library(multiwayvcov)
library(coeftest)
possible.ns <- seq(from=100, to=5000, by=100)
power.atleastone <- rep(NA, length(possible.ns))
power.bothtreatments <- rep(NA, length(possible.ns))
power.fullranking <- rep(NA, length(possible.ns))
alpha <- 0.05 #(two-tailed test at .05 level)
sims <- 100
rho.h <- 0.05
rho.l <- -0.05
#### Outer loop to vary the number of subjects ####
for (j in 1:length(possible.ns)){
N <- possible.ns[j]
p.LvsM <- rep(NA, sims)
p.HvsM <- rep(NA, sims)
p.HvsL <- rep(NA, sims)
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c.LvsM <- rep(NA, sims)
c.HvsM <- rep(NA, sims)
c.HvsL <- rep(NA, sims)
person <- rep(1:N, each = 8)
n_obs <- N*8
#### Inner loop to
conduct experiments "sims"
times over for each N ####
for (i in 1:sims){
# N = respondents
# J = choice tasks 4
# K = Profiles 2
treatment <- sample(c("L","M","H"), n_obs, replace = T)
treatment_L <- treatment == "L"
treatment_H <- treatment == "H"
y <- rep(NA, n_obs)
for( w in seq(1, n_obs, by = 2) ){
y[w] <- rbinom(1, 1, prob = (.5 +
rho.h*treatment_H[w] +
rho.l*treatment_L[w] -
rho.h*treatment_H[w + 1] -
rho.l*treatment_L[w + 1]
)
)
y[w + 1] <- ifelse(y[w] == 1, 0, 1)
}
frame.sim <- data.frame(y, person, treatment_L + treatment_H)
fit.sim <- lm(y ~ treatment_H + treatment_L, data = frame.sim)
vcov.sim <- cluster.vcov(fit.sim, frame.sim$person)
model_out <- coeftest(fit.sim, vcov.sim)
### Need to capture coefficients and pvalues (two-tailed tests)
c.LvsM[i] <- model_out[3,1]
c.HvsM[i] <- model_out[2,1]
c.HvsL[i] <- c.HvsM[i] - c.LvsM[i]
p.LvsM[i] <- model_out[3,4]
p.HvsM[i] <- model_out[2,4]
p.HvsL[i] <- pnorm( abs(c.HvsL[i]/
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sqrt( model_out[3,2]^2 + model_out[2,4]^2 )),
lower.tail = F )
}
power.atleastone[j] <- mean(c.LvsM < 0 & c.HvsM > 0 &
(p.LvsM < alpha | p.HvsM < alpha))
power.bothtreatments[j] <- mean(c.LvsM < 0 & c.HvsM > 0 &
p.LvsM < alpha & p.HvsM < alpha)
power.fullranking[j] <- mean(c.HvsL > 0 & p.HvsL < alpha)
print(j)
}
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